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ABSTRACT 
In order to commit attacks against the U.S. homeland, terrorists must enter the 
country.  Stopping their entry is key to preventing attacks.  The 9/11 Commission’s Staff 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 
and Terrorist Travel, identified pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses in U.S. immigration, visa, 
customs, and border security systems.  This thesis will consider the implementation of the 
9/11 Commission’s key recommendations for immigration:  1) provide standardized 
operational training and additional guidance to immigration, visa, and customs personnel, 
2) establish a foreign student visa compliance and tracking system, the Student and 
Exchange Visitor Information System, (SEVIS), and 3) develop and implement the 
National Security Exit and Entry Registration System (NSEERS).  This thesis will also 
assess the effectiveness of these policies as counterterror measures to determine if they 
can stop terrorists from entering the U.S.  Bruce Schneier’s Beyond Fear: Thinking 
Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World provides a five-step model to analyze and 
evaluate security systems, technologies, and countermeasures.  His model will be applied 
to assess the implementation/effectiveness of the three key recommendations.  To 
effectively establish priorities and efficiently allocate resources, policymakers require 
assessments of implemented homeland security recommendations.  This thesis offers 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
9/11 alerted the U.S.  The homeland was no longer immune to terrorist attacks.  
America did not stop terrorists from crossing its borders, traveling within its interior, and 
committing suicide attacks.  In order to commit attacks against the U.S. homeland, 
terrorists have to enter the country.  Stopping their entry is key to preventing attacks.  The 
events of 9/11 made a fact unequivocally and painfully evident:  “the entry of the 
hijackers into the United States therefore represented the culmination of years of 
experience in penetrating international borders.”1  The nineteen 9/11 hijackers capitalized 
on gaps and weaknesses inherent in U.S. immigration, visa, customs, and border security 
systems.  Because of these gaps/weaknesses, the nineteen terrorists were granted entry 
into the U.S.  More importantly, the U.S. missed crucial opportunities to exploit 
vulnerabilities of terrorist travel and mobility.  Pre-9/11 immigration, visa, customs, and 
border security systems were not designed to exploit terrorist travel and mobility 
vulnerabilities.   
The Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, identified pre-9/11 gaps and weaknesses in U.S. 
immigration, visa, customs, and border security systems.  9/11 and Terrorist Travel 
specified three major gaps/weaknesses:  1) marginal immigration, visa, and customs 
personnel training, 2) ineffective foreign student visa compliance tracking, and 3) 
nonexistent national entry-exit system.2  This thesis will consider the implementation of 
the 9/11 Commission’s key recommendations for immigration:  1) provide standardized 
operational training and additional guidance to immigration, visa, and customs personnel,    
2) establish a foreign student visa compliance and tracking system, the Student and 
Exchange Visitor Information System, (SEVIS), and 3) develop and implement the 
National Security Exit and Entry Registration System (NSEERS).3  This thesis will also 
                                                 
1 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel (Tennessee:  Hillsboro Press, 2004), 3. 
2 Ibid., 98, 100, 136, 137. 
3 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 149, 164, 155.  
2 
asses the effectiveness of these policies as counterterror measures to determine if they 
can stop terrorists from entering the U.S.  
The Department of Homeland Security is now home to “most of the policy and 
implementation functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).”4  
A component of the U.S. response to the events of 9/11 was political, organizational, and 
bureaucratic.  America subordinated immigration policy to terrorism policy.5  This 
change was institutionalized by the “break-up of the [Immigration and Naturalization 
Service] INS and the reallocation of its functions to the DHS” and the DHS establishment 
of three new bureaus with immigration responsibilities:  Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) following the enactment of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.6   
These three newly realigned and restructured bureaus along with the U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs serve as the first line or “perimeter” 
defense against terrorist attacks.7  Front line immigration, visa, and customs officials who 
comprise the first line of defense must be trained in order to implement counterterrorism 
measures designed to stop terrorists from entering the country.  They must be trained to 
recognize missed and dismissed indicators.  They must be compliant in and accountable 
for the execution of their duties.  They must follow the rules to affect terrorist capability 
and to bolster our defenses.  In order to enhance their ability to follow the rules, they 
must have automated tools that leverage technology.   
Automated tools/databases have been established:  a foreign student visa 
compliance tracking system (SEVIS) and a national entry-exit system (NSEERS).  
SEVIS automated an existing manual data collection process and became operational for 
                                                 
4 Megan Davy, Deborah W. Meyers, and Jeanne Batalova,“Who Does What in US Immigration,”  
Migration Information Source, 1 December 2005, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=362 (accessed 4 October 2006), 1. 
5 Karen C. Tumlin, “Suspect First:  How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy,” 
California Law Review 92 (July 2004), 1174.   
6 Susan Martin and Philip Martin, “International Migration and Terrorism,” Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 18 (2004), 330. 
7 Michael E. O’Hanlon, et al., Protecting the American Homeland (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002), 14. 
3 
all incoming foreign students on 15 February 2003.8  The INS created this foreign student 
monitoring system and established a process for educational institutions 1) to have their 
SEVIS certification completed and 2) to electronically report information on all new and 
continuing students into the SEVIS.9  SEVIS addresses the specific challenges that 
students present to homeland security efforts:  “It is difficult for DHS to know when 
foreign students have overstayed because the duration of status lacks a fixed termination 
date, and schools, although required to report students who stop attending, have not been 
required until recently to systematically report data on the progress of foreign students.”10  
SEVIS was designed to track visitors and their dependents with F (academic and 
language student), M (vocational student), and J (exchange visitor)11 classes of 
temporary/nonimmigrant visas.12  In Fiscal Year 2005, Consular Affairs issued a total of 
565,790 temporary/nonimmigrant foreign student and exchange visitor visas:  255,993 F, 
                                                 
8Alison Siskin, “Monitoring Foreign Students in the United States:  The Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS),” CRS Report for Congress, 20 October 2005, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44016.pdf (accessed 7 September 2006), 1. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 Chad Christian Haddal, “Foreign Students in the United States:  Policies and Legislation, ” CRS 
Report to Congress, 11 October 2006, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31146.pdf (accessed 5 
November 2006), 4-5.  Nonimmigrant foreign students are processed by four different federal agencies 
during their tenure as applicants to and foreign students at U.S. higher education institutions.  The first 
encounter will be with the Department of State (DOS), which conducts the applicant interviews and either 
grants or rejects the visa applications.  Once a nonimmigrant arrives at a U.S. port of entry, the individual 
receives an inspection by CBP.  The student’s arrival is reported to the ICE for entry into SEVIS.  After 
entry, the alien’s academic institution is responsible for reporting information to the SEVIS database.  The 
SEVIS information is then shared with DOS, CBP, and USCIS.     
11 Ibid., 2- 4.  The M visa is the least used of three foreign student visa categories.  Exchange visitors 
on a J visa (also referred to as the Fulbright program) are admitted for the purpose of cultural exchange.  
These visitors include scholars, professors, teachers, trainees, specialists, foreign medical graduates, 
international visitors, au pairs, and participants in student/travel work programs. 
12 Jessica Vaughan, “Shortcuts to Immigration:  ‘The Temporary’ Visa Program is Broken,” January 
2003, http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back103.pdf (accessed 19 September 2006), 2.  F and M class 
foreign student and J class exchange visitor visas have different lengths of “maximum stay,” or Duration of 
Status (D/S).  The maximum stay limits for F class (academic and language student) visas is the duration of 
study, plus 12 months for “Optional Practical Training” Work.  The maximum stay limit for M class 
(vocational student) visas is one year course of study plus 30 days, plus 6 months “Optional Practical 
Training” Work.  The maximum stay for J class (exchange visitor) visas is one year of course of study plus 
30 days, plus 6 months “Optional Practical Training” Work.  The additional 60 and 30 days are intended 
for departure preparations from the U.S.  In the case of F visa holders, 60 days can also be used to transfer 
to another school.  U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Student Visas,” June 2006, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1268.html (accessed 10 November 2006), 5.  “Optional 
Practical Training” is a type of on-campus work-study program which relates to the specific degree 
program, such as paid research and teaching assistantships.  Nonimmigrants who possess an F visa are 
generally not allowed to engage in off-campus employment.  For example, F students who accept off-
campus employment violate the terms of their visas and are subject to removal and other penalties.  Haddal, 
2.     
4 
5,975 M, and 303,822 J visas.13  The number of foreign and exchange student admissions 
with dependents total 1,046,421 for 2005.  654,973 are F class admissions, 8,985 are M 
class admissions, and 382,463 are J class admissions.14  The disparity between the totals 
of issued visas and admissions is due to the travel pattern and documentation of multiple 
entries/admissions of foreign students and exchange visitors.15  Upon each 
entry/admission, the student must submit an Arrival-Departure Record, or DHS Form I-
94.  Therefore, the number of admissions exceeds the total number of individual visitors 
and the total number of visas issued.16  According to 2005 figures, SEVIS should account 
for 10.5% of the total temporary/nonimmigrant visas that are issued (5,388,937).  SEVIS 
and NEESRS track a targeted subset of the total temporary/nonimmigrant population. 17  
NSEERS was developed to track the entry and exit of temporary/nonimmigrant 
foreign nationals representing “predominantly Arab and Muslim countries”18 to include 
foreign student and exchange visitors.  The total number of temporary/nonimmigrant 
visas issued for 2005 was 5,388,937.19  Due to multiple entries/exits, the total number of 
temporary/nonimmigrant visitor admissions for 2005 was recorded at 32 million.20  
NSEERS enables the “the U.S. government [to] keep track of the more than 35 million 
nonimmigrant visitors who enter the United States as well as some nonimmigrant visitors 
already in the United States.”  Visitors are required to register with immigration 
authorities either at a port-of-entry or a designated ICE office.21 
                                                 
13 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Table XVI (A), Classes of Nonimmigrants 
Issued Visas (Including Crewlist Visas and Border Crossing Cards):  Fiscal Years 2001-2005,” Report of 
the Visa Office, Visa Statistics, http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY05tableXVIa.pdf (accessed 10 November 
2006), 1.  
14 Elizabeth M. Grieco, “Temporary Admissions of Nonimmigrants to the United States:  2005,” 
Office of Immigration Statistics Annual Flow Report, July 2006, 
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/2005_NI_rpt.pdf (accessed 5 September 
2006), 3. 
15 Ibid., 5.   
16 Ibid., 1. 
17 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 155. 
18 Ibid., 155. 
19 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Table I, Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued at Foreign Service Posts:  Fiscal Years 2001-2005,” Report of the Visa Office, Visa Statistics, 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY05tableI.pdf (10 November 2006), 1. 
20 Grieco, 1. 
21 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Special Registration,” Public Information, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/specialregistration/index.htm (accessed 10 November 2006), 1.  
5 
According to 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, “the INS implemented the National 
Security Exit and Entry Registration System at selected ports of entry” on the one year 
anniversary of 9/11.  NSEERS mandated the following: 
1. Photographing, fingerprinting, and interviewing of foreign nationals 
from a total of twenty-five predominantly Arab and Muslim countries 
upon their arrival in the U.S. 
2. Required the same kind of registration for such individuals already in 
the U.S.   
3. These individuals must be reinterviewed 30 days after their entry to 
the U.S., notify the INS if they changed their address, present 
themselves for an annual interview if they remained inside the U.S., 
and have an interview when they depart the U.S. 
4. Enforcement measures against those who were found to be in violation 
of immigration or other laws when they sought to register or who 
violated program rules (for example, failing to register at all).22 
With the dissolution of INS, ICE assumed implementation and oversight 
responsibilities of both SEVIS and NSEERS.23  The SEVIS and NSEERS databases must 
be populated with accurate and current information.  This information is shared amongst 
several sources:  law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other countries.  In order to 
enhance data sharing efforts, immigration, visa, and customs officials must have access to 
law enforcement databases, intelligence agencies must be cooperative, and visa 
admission policies and procedures must be coordinated with other countries.  Of course, 
the technological tools should not be divorced from the human element.  A system of 




                                                 
22 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 155. 
23 Ruth Ellen Wasem, “Toward More Effective Immigration Policies:  Selected Organizational 
Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, 17 March 2006, http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/RL33319.pdf 
(accessed 7 September 2006), 10 and 13. 
6 
B. AN ASSESSMENT MODEL:  SCHNEIER’S FIVE-STEP MODEL 
Bruce Schneier’s Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain 
World provides a five-step model to analyze and evaluate security systems, technologies, 
and countermeasures.24   
Step 1:  What assets are you trying to protect? 
Step 2:  What are the risks to these assets? 
Step 3:  How well does the security solution mitigate the risk? 
Step 4:  What other risks does the security solution cause? 
Step 5:  What trade-offs does the security solution require?25 
His model will be applied to assess the post-9/11 implementation and effectiveness of the 
three recommendations, or “security solutions.”     
Schneier advises us to look beyond fear when analyzing security solutions.  He 
proposes we rationally ask the question:  what are we trying to achieve?  We cannot 
secure every inch of the 7,514-mile U.S. Canada/Mexico border and the 12,380 miles of 
coastline due to resource constraints and competing priorities.  What 
countermeasures/policy options will therefore take priority?  Which priorities will be 
allocated the limited resources (people, money, and time)?  Most importantly, we must 
inquire:  if we do not achieve our objectives, was it worth the resource and trade-off 
costs?  With the resources that have been allocated to the immigration, visa, customs, and 
border security systems, the first line or “perimeter” of defense, we must ensure the most 
important resource—the people—are trained.  Immigration, visa, and customs personnel 
must have the right technological tools and databases, intelligence and law enforcement 
information, and coordination from other countries.26  The 9/11 Commission asserts,  
Before 9/11, no executive department had, as its first priority, the job of 
defending America from domestic attack.  That changed with the 2002 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security.  This department now 
has the lead responsibility for problems that feature so prominently in the 
9/11 story, such as protecting borders….Throughout the government, 
                                                 
24 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear:  Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New 
York:  Copernicus Books, 2003), 14.   
25 Ibid., 233-245. 
26 O’Hanlon, et al., Protecting the American Homeland, 14. 
7 
nothing has been harder for officials—executive or legislative—than to set 
priorities, making hard choices in allocating limited resources.27 
C. PURPOSE 
The U.S. has finite resources, yet there are limitless homeland security 
requirements, programs, and policies that compete for funding.  Assessing the post-9/11 
implementation and effectiveness of three key recommendations is essential.  
Determining their value as counterterror measures is required for establishing priorities 
and allocating resources for U.S. homeland security.  Stopping terrorist entrance is a top 
priority for the U.S.  Schneier’s five-step model will prove indispensable in assessing the 
implementation and effectiveness of the key recommendations, or “security solutions.”  
By addressing the model’s steps, this thesis will answer the question:  Do the ends of 
training, SEVIS, and NSEERS justify their means?  The ends of their implementation are 
defined by their effectiveness/ability to stop terrorists.  The means to implement them are 
their prioritization, resource allocation, and costs/trade-offs.  
To effectively establish priorities and efficiently allocate resources, policymakers 
and officials require effectiveness assessments of implemented homeland security 
recommendations.  By offering such an assessment, this thesis would be relevant to and 
utilized by policymakers and immigration, visa, and customs officials who must prioritize 
countermeasures and allocate resources.  By barring terrorist entrance into the U.S., we 
take away one of their most important weapons—their freedom—to travel, enter, and 
attack.  By denying their freedoms, we guarantee the freedoms of American citizens and 
even noncitizens to life and liberty.  Eli Lehrer argues that barring potential terrorists 
from entering the country is a control mechanism that serves as one of the three basic 
tenets of homeland security:    
When a nation seeking to protect itself finds diplomacy, war, and foreign 
intelligence gathering insufficient, it can undertake three other types of 
activities to defend itself.  It can control the movement of potential 
terrorists entering the country or traveling within it; it can capture or 
neutralize terrorist plotters within its borders; and when all else fails, it can 
mitigate damage from terrorist attacks. These three activities--access 
control, law enforcement, and disaster mitigation--comprise the essentials 
of homeland security. Congress and the Bush administration have 
                                                 
27 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report (New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 395. 
8 
consolidated many federal efforts to accomplish these three tasks in the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  In so doing they hope to 
protect the nation from future terrorist attacks.28 
D. FACT-BASED ASSUMPTIONS 
One assumption of this thesis is that terrorists will exploit legal means of entering 
the U.S. to not raise suspicion and to ensure long-term operational stability.29   The 
second assumption is that terrorists prefer to use temporary/nonimmigrant visas (NIVs) 
(i.e., student, visitor, business).  Michael Welch surmises that at least 15 of the 19 
terrorists entered the country legally on some form of temporary visa.30  Both of these 
assumptions seem validated by the travel patterns of the 9/11 hijackers.  The 9/11 
Commission reveals,  
As we know from the sizable illegal traffic across our land borders, a 
terrorist could attempt to bypass legal procedures and enter the United 
States surreptitiously.  None of the 9/11 attackers entered or tried to enter 
our country [illegally]…we will focus on the hijackers’ exploitation of 
legal entry systems.31 
Terrorist preference for legal means can be traced to the motivations and modes 
demonstrated a decade before the events of 9/11:  “Because terrorist operations were not 
                                                 
28 Eli Lehrer, “The Homeland Security Bureaucracy,” The Public Interest 156 (Summer 2004), 71. 
[emphasis added] 
29 Janice L. Kephart, “Immigration and Terrorism:  Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist 
Travel,” Center for Immigration Studies Center Paper 24, September 2005, 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.pdf (accessed 9 April 2006), 7.  In a Center for Immigration 
Studies report, Janice Kephart presents the immigration histories of 94 terrorists who operated in the U.S. 
between the early 1990s and 2004, including six of the 9/11 hijackers.  She also emphasizes the importance 
of legality to terrorists:  “They all had to travel to the United States…Few had difficulty getting 
[in]….What requires emphasis is the ease with which the terrorists have moved through U.S. border 
security…The security gaps that existed then still…exist today….Once within the U.S. borders, terrorists 
seek to stay.  Doing so with the appearance of legality helps ensure long-term operational stability.” 
30 Michael Welch, Detained:  Immigration Law and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2002), 188.  
31 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers 
Into the United States,” Staff Statement #1, Seventh Public Hearing Archive, 26 January 2004, 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_1. 
pdf#search=%22none%20of%209%2F11%20terrorists%20%22 (accessed 2 September 2006), 8.  The 9/11 
Commission adds to the legality discussion present in the literature:  “A review of…the hijackers paints a 
picture of conspirators who put the ability to exploit U.S. border security while not raising suspicion about 
their terrorist activities high on their operational priorities….Mohamed Atta…was acutely aware of his 
immigration status [and] tried to remain in the [U.S.] legally.”  9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 130.  
9 
suicide missions in the early to mid-1990s, once in the United States terrorists and their 
supporters tried to get legal immigration status that would permit them to remain here.”32 
Three studies corroborate these assumptions.  Terrorists prefer to exploit legal 
immigration, visa, and customs systems by obtaining temporary/nonimmigrant visas.  
Steven Camarota’s data set was comprised of 48 foreign-born militant Islamic terrorists 
that have been charged, convicted, pled guilty, or admitted to involvement in terrorism 
within the U.S. in the period from 1993 to 2001.  All had linkages to Al Qaeda.  At the 
time the terrorists committed their crimes, 33% (16 of 48) of them were on temporary 
visas.33  Janice Kephart’s study of 94 terrorists who operated in the U.S. between the 
early 1990s and 2004 echoes these assumptions:   
Temporary visas were a common means of entering; 18 terrorists had 
student visas and another four had applications to study in the United 
States.  At least 17 used a visitor visa – either tourist (B2) or business 
(B1)….In at least 13 instances, terrorists overstayed their visas.34 
The Migration Policy Institute commissioned Task Force on Immigration and 
America’s Future reasons that terrorists “are unlikely to risk their lives or operations 
crossing through the desert or entrusting themselves to smugglers.”35  What terrorists are 
likely to do is enter through legal channels by using fraudulent travel documents (i.e., 
passports, visas, entry-exit stamps, and secondary identification).36  Exploiting legal 
entry systems and using temporary visas offers the most expeditious and civil path of 
least resistance.  Immigration, visa, and customs officials and policymakers have been 
                                                 
32 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 49.  
33 Steven A. Camarota, “The Open Door:  How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in 
the United States, 1993-2001,” Center for Immigration Studies Center Paper #21, May 2002, 
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preoccupied with illegal immigrants who gain unauthorized access and intending 
immigrants who exploit legal entry systems.  This preoccupation has grave implications 
for homeland security.  Seldom have the focus, priority, and resources been directed to 
terrorist exploitation of legal modes of travel and entry.  Yet, terrorists successfully 
mirrored a pre-9/11 belief and practice of intending immigrants:  “it is easier and safer for 
an intending immigrant to pay a $45 visa interview fee and mislead a consular officer 
who has received training in cultural sensitivity and interview courtesy.”37   
The Task Force bolsters the legal means argument and explains the policy 
ramifications associated with it:  “Despite the fact that all of the 9/11 hijackers came 
through legal ports of entry and used visas obtained at overseas consulates, legal channels 
of entry are often overlooked in the public debate and in Congressional appropriations.”38  
By overlooking this fact-based assumption, policymakers dedicate the overwhelming 
majority of their time and efforts to countering illegal modes of travel and entry.  The fact 
that decision makers allocate attention, interest, priorities, and resources to illegal 
immigration and southwest border security is illustrative.  To secure the U.S.-Mexico 
border and combat illegal immigration, resource appropriations for the Border Patrol 
increased by 508 percent (from $281 million to $1.6 billion) during the period marked by 
the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act through 2002.  In contrast, 
spending for Consular Affairs which has the critical role of identifying and intercepting 
terrorists abroad only experienced an eight percent increase, from $281 to $303 million 
during the same period.39   
From 2002 to 2005, the Border Patrol budget has remained constant at $1.4 
billion, dipping to $1.2 billion in 2004.  Just as a large proportion of funds are allocated 
to the Border Patrol, a majority of the Border Patrol agents are deployed to “[fortify] 
traditional border-crossing locales in the southwest (about 90% of all Border Patrol 
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agents).”40  Border enforcement policy designed to stem unauthorized flows, “has been 
the only component of immigration funding that consistently wins bipartisan  
political support, irrespective of outcomes.”41   
The topic of illegal immigration relates to the third fact-based assumption.  The 
issue of approximately 12 million illegal immigrants is much broader in economic and 
political scope.  This contentious issue will not be addressed in this thesis even though 
illegals/illegal immigration are often conflated with terrorists/national security concerns.  
Sean Garcia states, “The terrorist argument takes advantage of public fears of terrorist 
attacks to combat the unrelated problem of illegal immigration.”42  Consequently, this 
conflation has provided the ammunition for the Border Patrol to consistently win the 
priority and funding war.  The main focus of this thesis will be that of temporary visa 
holders (student, visitor, business) who enter the U.S. for a specific period of time and 
who may violate the terms of their visas by being out-of-status.43  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is crafted from the analysis and research of a myriad of disparate 
sources.  The three 9/11 Commission sources—The 9/11 Commission Report, 9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel, and the Public Discourse Project--serve as the primary sources of this 
thesis.  9/11 and Terrorist Travel, is a targeted monograph tied to the overarching 9/11 
Commission’s independent, bipartisan efforts--The 9/11 Commission Report.  9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel is the culmination of 14 months of study, evaluation, and research that 
pertains to pre- and post-9/11 “‘immigration, nonimmigrant visas and border security.’”44 
The Public Discourse Project was intended to carry the torch of information  
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dissemination and status follow-up for the 9/11 Commission.  Picking up where the 
Commission and its subsequent Public Discourse Project left off proved troubling and 
pointed to a gap in the literature.   
With the disbanding of the 9/11 Commission on 21 August 2004 and the end of 
the Public Discourse Project operations on 31 December 2005,45 what organizations 
provide oversight and follow-up in regards to the implementation and effectiveness of the 
9/11 Commission’s comprehensive recommendations?  The Center for Immigration 
Studies, National Immigration Forum, Brookings Institution, Immigration Policy Center, 
Migration Policy Institute, current United Nations and U.S. counterterrorism strategies, 
Congressional hearings and legislation, CRS and GAO reports, policy briefs, law 
journals, scholarly journals, and expert sources offer implementation information, status 
updates, and effectiveness assessments.  These secondary sources will be tapped in order 
to argue the central claim of this thesis.   
Many of the sources confirm that the aim/objective of the three recommendations 
is to disrupt terrorist travel/mobility.  This aim/objective aligns with both multi- and 
unilateral counterterrorism strategies.  In order to achieve this aim/objective and support 
these strategies, the three security solutions have been implemented to enhance security 
at legal entrances and to target terrorist travel/mobility away (abroad and in-transit) and 
home (at the border and in-country).  Assessing the post-9/11 implementation of the three 
recommendations is essential for homeland security prioritization and resource allocation 
decisions.  Analysis of their effectiveness as counterterror measures should impact the 
decisions of policymakers, immigration, visa, customs, and border security officials.  
Assessments that analyze their ability to prevent terrorist entry are valuable and needed. 
Such assessments will help decision makers determine if the key recommendations 
should be given the appropriate priority and receive commensurate funding.  By 
analyzing and drawing together various assessments, this thesis will help fill the 
acknowledged gap in the literature:  “Currently, no single agency or bureau develops 
immigration policy, coordinates the work, and assesses the effectiveness of various 
federal agencies in performing their immigration functions.”46 
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Policy options analysis is the most appropriate method to examine the three key 
recommendations offered by 9/11 and Terrorist Travel in order to describe their 
implementation and assess their effectiveness.  The criterion to measure their 
effectiveness is the denial of terrorist entrance into the U.S and the absence of terrorist 
attacks on the U.S. homeland.  Denying terrorist entrance is dependent upon identifying 
gaps/weaknesses and tailoring recommendations to address the gaps/weaknesses.  As a 
first attempt to explore the implementation and assessment of three key post-9/11 
recommendations with Schneier’s five-step model, this thesis would be relevant to and 
utilized by policy and decision makers and immigration, visa, and customs authorities 
who must prioritize countermeasures and allocate resources accordingly.   
F. GAPS, WEAKNESSES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section will present the three major pre-9/11 gaps and weaknesses outlined in 
and the post-9/11 recommendations prescribed by 9/11 and Terrorist Travel.  This 
section is comprised of two subsections.  The first subsection will cover the three major 
pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses:  1) marginal immigration, visa, and customs personnel 
training, 2) ineffective foreign student visa compliance tracking, and 3) nonexistent 
national entry-exit system.  The second subsection will outline the three post-9/11 
recommendations:  1) provide standardized operational training and additional guidance to 
immigration, visa, and customs personnel, 2) establish a foreign student visa compliance and 
tracking system, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, (SEVIS), and 3) 
develop and implement the National Security Exit and Entry Registration System 
(NSEERS).47  The pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses represent U.S. vulnerabilities that presented 
opportunities for the 9/11 terrorists to exploit.  The post-9/11 recommendations offer the 
U.S. opportunities to enhance homeland security by exploiting terrorist travel and 
mobility vulnerabilities. 
1. Pre-9/11 Gaps and Weaknesses 
The current literature points to gaps/weaknesses in pre-9/11 immigration, visa, 
customs, and border security systems.  These gaps/weaknesses enabled terrorists (in 
1993, for the Millennium Plot, and in 2001) to gain entry into and pose a threat to the 
U.S. homeland.  The unfortunate lessons of the 1993 World Trade Center, Millennium 
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Plot, and 9/11 are the same.  One important lesson learned is that terrorists exhibited 
travel patterns.  Yet, “No government agency would analyze terrorists’ travel patterns 
until after 9/11, thus missing critical opportunities to disrupt their plans.”48   
9/11 and Terrorist Travel argues U.S. immigration, visa, customs, and border 
security systems were founded on economics (globalization, travel, trade, foreign policy, 
diplomacy, and customer service) rather than national security or counterterrorism as is 
the case post-9/11.  For economic reasons, U.S. immigration, visa, customs, and border 
security systems were designed to keep illegals out by excluding intending immigrants 
especially those from poorer countries.49  They were not designed to exclude terrorists.50  
The goal of pre-9/11 U.S. immigration, visa, customs, and border security was to prevent 
the entry of illegal aliens, intending immigrants, known criminals, and drug couriers.51  
9/11 would change things.  
U.S. immigration, visa, and customs personnel also operated within a “culture of 
diplomacy” and “a dangerous culture of permissiveness in airport inspections” and 
followed a ‘customer-service approach’”52 as opposed to operating within a culture of 
national security and following a counterterrorism approach.  For example, Michael 
Garcia and Ruth Wasem contend, “The 9/11 Commission concluded that the key officials 
responsible for determining alien admissions (consular officers abroad and immigration 
inspectors in the United States) were not considered full partners in counterterrorism efforts 
prior to September 11, 2001.”53  These key officials operated in “an environment of travel 
facilitation” that afforded them only 45 seconds to process each customer.” 54  According 
to 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, pressures to facilitate travel came from various government 
and commercial sectors such as embassies, members of Congress, the travel industry, and 
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commercial airlines.55  The quest for efficient and quick passenger processing was 
prompted by Section 286 of the 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act “that limited the 
total amount of time for a visitor to disembark from a plane and be processed through 
immigration inspection to 45 minutes, regardless of the number of passengers on the 
flight.”56 
Personnel experienced cultural and environmental pressures of diplomacy, 
permissiveness, and travel facilitation.  These pressures were compounded by inadequate 
training.  9/11 and Terrorist Travel identified five major areas of training that were 
inadequate pre-9/11:  inspector, counterterrorism, primary and secondary inspection, 
document fraud, and database training.  A consensus prevailed among inspectors that 
training remained largely unchanged from the period of the 1970s through 2000.57  
Furthermore, the expectation persisted that “real” learning of inspection, document fraud, 
and database duties would take place at their assignments, and informal on-the-job 
training was stressed.  On-the-job training efforts would be overwhelmed by customer 
and paperwork workloads and would not account for or reflect real-time intelligence and 
law enforcement information.  Most training available or provided was outdated, 
infrequent, non-standardized, and lacked operational focus.  Training that has an 
operational focus reflects an awareness, analysis, and inclusion of historical, present, and 
forecasted terrorist travel trends, techniques, tactics, and patterns.58  The five areas lacked 
a solid counterterrorism focus.   
Without a defined counterterrorism role and lacking the associated training, 
immigration, visa, and customs officials missed indicators of Islamic Fundamentalism 
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and dismissed fraudulent documents.59  These officials are not completely to blame for 
these oversights.  Because of intelligence oversight and sharing challenges, training 
lacked an operational focus.  Training with an operational focus would have included 
lessons on indicators and fraud.  Intelligence and law enforcement communities share in 
the culpability of intelligence oversight.  Pre-9/11, some elements of terrorist travel, 
trends, techniques, and pattern intelligence were collected.  Yet, the intelligence was 
neither fully developed nor shared with immigration, visa, customs, and border security 
personnel.   
Raw data was collected but not completely analyzed nor shared in useable forms.  
The 9/11 Commission informs that during the 1990s, law enforcement investigations 
revealed a great deal of information on the travel tactics of terrorists.60  However, this 
available information would quickly become outdated such as the two CIA produced 
training aids:  “The Threat is Real” video (early 1980s) and the “Redbook” (1992) 
manual:61   
the existence of a CIA training video and a manual is evidence of an 
understanding that terrorists relied on certain tactics when they traveled 
and that they could be stopped by alert individuals who recognized the use 
of those tactics….As the Redbook makes clear, by early 1993, when the 
first attack on the World Trade Center took place, the intelligence 
community already had decades of experience with the modes of travel of 
terrorist groups.62 
Due to the general lack of a counterterrorism emphasis, pre-9/11 immigration, 
visa, customs, and border security personnel exercised a minimalist role.  
Counterterrorism efforts were relegated to the simple cross-referencing of watchlists.  It 
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seems logical that untrained officials would not be able to gain on-the-job experience if 
they never had the opportunity to flex their counterterrorism muscles.63  In the case of the 
State Department, consular officials charged with reviewing visa applications were not 
trained to identify indicators of terrorist affiliation and Islamic extremism.64  Therefore, 
their visa decisions upheld the pre-9/11 objective of excluding intending immigrants.  
They based their decisions to issue or deny visas solely on checking a database of names 
to single out criminals and terrorists.65   
Once terrorists transit to the U.S., the front-line immigration, customs, and border 
security inspectors must stop them from entering.  Their training is absolutely crucial to 
denying terrorist entry.  At the border, inspectors at U.S. ports-of-entry would also 
encounter the same training shortcomings and database challenges.  Inspectors at U.S. 
ports-of-entry did not have the appropriate counterterrorism training:  “[Any] ignorance 
was largely a function of a technological approach to terrorist screening that relied almost 
exclusively on a mechanical, computerized name check at the primary immigration 
inspection.”66 
The quantity of watchlists presents challenges to semi-trained and overwhelmed 
personnel.  Twelve separate watchlists are administered by nine different government 
agencies.67  Like all other databases, watchlists are only as good as the information used 
to populate them.  Therefore, the information provided would be dependent on the level, 
quality, and currency of intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and customs 
information sharing.  In regards to the nineteen 9/11 terrorists, U.S. intelligence 
discovered that at least three of the hijackers had connections with terrorist groups, yet 
their names were not placed on border inspectors’ watchlists.68  By relying on watchlists, 
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officials would miss opportunities to identify terrorists during other procedures (i.e., 
document inspections and applicant interviews).   
Databases should supplement the training provided to and skills possessed by 
immigration, visa, and customs officials.  Pre-9/11 database training was lacking even 
though quantities of database were not:  “although there was training in the existence of 
the 20-plus databases available in primary and secondary immigration and customs 
inspection, immigration inspectors were not taught the content and value of these 
databases.”69  No database training was conducted at the formal training course.  
Therefore, when inspectors crossed paths with the 9/11 hijackers, the inspectors were 
unaware terrorists were included in these databases.  Hence, they did know they should 
be searching for them.  The search for criminals, illegals, and intending immigrants 
eclipsed counterterror measures.   
The benefits of technology, databases, and automation cannot be denied.  
Technology can enable personnel to perform their jobs more quickly, but it should not be 
completely relied upon.  There is no substitute for an experienced and trained official 
who can adeptly pick up on intangible factors such as behavioral and cultural cues.70  
Inadequate training and travel facilitation exasperated an irony of visa system.   
Such irony would prove dangerous in light of the lessons of 9/11:        
Visa officers have long been criticized for being too cautious, denying 
visas to too many people with legitimate reasons to travel in the United 
States.  Still many applicants who intend to violate the terms of their visa 
have applications approved.71   
The 9/11 terrorists intended to violate the terms of their approved visas.  They 
submitted false statements and fraudulent documents to obtain visas at overseas 
consulates, pass U.S. immigration and customs inspections, and gain entry.72  They 
adjusted their status without notifying the proper authorities and/or overstayed the time 
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limits imposed by their temporary/nonimmigrant visas.  For the few nefarious visitors 
granted visas and entry, follow-up did not transpire between the educational institutions 
and immigration, visa, and customs authorities.  Some were on tourist visas but instead 
enrolled in flight training school, and others were on student visas and never showed up 
for school.73   
These gap/weaknesses validated the recommendations for the foreign student visa 
compliance and entry-exit tracking systems.74  A foreign student visa compliance 
tracking system serves as a “truancy” tool to track foreign students at the border and post-
entry.  As the name implies, an entry-exit tracking system logs the entry and exits of U.S. 
visitors.  Pre-9/11, no national tracking system existed to match a visitor’s entry to their 
exit.75  Therefore, the U.S. lacked a straightforward and vital capability to determine if 
any visitor had overstayed a previous visit:76 
The events of 9/11 provide a case in point:  not a single one of the known 
hijackers, nor any of the other suspects subsequently identified, qualified 
as an “immigrant,” in the sense of someone who was legally admitted to 
the United States for permanent resettlement or had lived there illegally 
for an extended period.  As it happens, they had all entered the country 
legally as duly authorized visitors, although some subsequently overstayed 
the allowed period and hence became “illegal aliens” by the time they 
committed their crimes.77 
Even though the terrorists would overstay and violate the terms of their visas, they 
did obtain passports and visas to facilitate their exploitation of the legal immigration, 
temporary/nonimmigrant visa, and customs inspection systems.  In order to obtain 
passports, visas, and access, they would make false statements and submit fraudulent 
documents.  Together with a stronger training regimen, student visa compliance tracking 
and entry-exit systems would have enhanced the U.S. ability to enforce its immigration, 
visa, and customs laws and would have flagged visitors who overstayed their visas.  
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These tracking systems would have to compensate for the flawed and vulnerable 
immigration, visa, customs, and borders security systems.   
2. Post-9/11 Recommendations to Address Gaps/Weaknesses  
9/11 and Terrorist Travel prescribes recommendations to address 
gaps/weaknesses.  Three key post-9/11 recommendations are 1) provide standardized 
operational training and additional guidance to immigration, visa, and customs personnel,     
2) establish a foreign student visa compliance and tracking system, the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System, (SEVIS), and 3) develop and implement the National Security 
Exit and Entry Registration System (NSEERS).78  By implementing these key security 
solutions, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance homeland security by exploiting 
terrorist travel and mobility vulnerabilities.   
Post-9/11, the U.S. has attempted to fill gaps in flawed immigration, visa, 
customs, and border security systems to stop terrorists from entering the country.  The 
U.S. has attempted to patch holes in these systems, as they were exploited by the 19 9/11 
terrorists.  The patchwork of countermeasures has experienced varying degrees of success 
and effectiveness.  The post-9/11 “patchwork” response has been best characterized by 
Mark Krikorian:   
Unfortunately, our immigration response to the wake-up call delivered by 
the 9/11 attacks has been piecemeal and poorly coordinated.  Specific 
initiatives that should have been set in motion years ago have finally 
begun to be enacted, but there is an ad hoc feel to our response, a sense 
that bureaucrats in the Justice and Homeland Security departments are 
searching for ways to tighten up immigration controls that will not alienate 
one or another of a bevy of special interest groups.79 
Identifying and intercepting terrorists as far away as possible from the intended 
target—the U.S.—is the optimal objective for the U.S.  This objective calls for the U.S. 
to “push out our borders.”80  More time, money, and lives are saved when this objective 
can be achieved.81  To successfully accomplish this objective, the Department of State 
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Consular Affairs must take on and fulfill its role as “America’s Other Border Patrol.”82  
This objective requires enhanced domestic and international law enforcement, 
intelligence, immigration, visa, and customs information sharing, coordination, and 
cooperation.  Chapter II of this thesis will elaborate on this optimal objective by offering 
a “home” and “away” game approach.  The “home” and “away” game approach explains 
how the three key recommendations align and support multi- and unilateral 
counterterrorism strategies that are designed to disrupt terrorist travel/mobility abroad, at 
the border, and in-country.  The multi- and unilateral strategies provide resolutions and 
provisions to enhance international and domestic information sharing, coordination, and 
cooperation.   
For terrorists desiring to travel and enter the United States, their journey begins 
abroad.  Each interaction with immigration, visa, and customs officials presents an 
opportunity to exploit terrorist travel/mobility.83  The first interaction with U.S. officials 
is at their country’s respective Department of State overseas-based Consular Affairs.  
Foreign nationals initiate the travel process by applying for temporary/nonimmigrant 
visas.  Counterterrorism-trained consular officials could identify potential terrorists 
amongst the pool of prospective applicants through the use of inspector interviews, 
current watchlists, and visa overstay/term violation databases.  For example, during the 
foreign student visa adjudication process, Consular Affairs officials access the SEVIS 
database to verify prospective applicants’ acceptance to and intended attendance at an 
educational institution.84  To ensure the accuracy and currency of operational training, 
watchlists, and databases, coordination and information sharing with international and 
domestic intelligence and law enforcement communities are essential.  Cooperative visa 
issuance and admission arrangements must also be forged with overseas diplomatic corps 
officials to successfully exploit terrorist travel and mobility.  Intercepting terrorists and 
foiling their plans abroad makes the job of U.S. officials stationed at home “easier.”   
Consular Affairs have employed practices and procedures to make their jobs 
easier.  These practices and procedures can no longer be encouraged in the post-9/11 
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security environment.  Consular Affairs’ practices of issuing visas “for the maximum 
period of validity” and “passing the buck” of identifying intending immigrants to INS 
border inspectors should not be accepted post-9/11 business practices.85  These practices 
and procedures were founded on premises that are counter to the counterterror focus of 
post-9/11 recommendations.  To lessen workloads and streamline processes, encouraging 
the issuance of maximum validity visas was based on the following premise:  “As the 
theory goes, if an applicant if going to overstay, he only needs one opportunity.”86  This 
practice was codified in a 15 March 2001 telegram disseminated to all overseas Consular 
Affairs posts.  The telegram voiced concerns over customer service and diplomacy:  
“Limiting visa validity…opens our posts to charges they are treating applicants from the 
host country unfairly, and creates additional workload while doing little, if anything to 
discourage determined intending immigrants from remaining in the United States.”87  
“Passing the buck” of identifying intending immigrants and now terrorists is not 
acceptable.  The telegram also communicated the illogical and dangerous thinking behind 
this practice.  Such thinking no longer belongs in post-9/11 immigration, visa, and 
customs mindsets and circles:  “INS inspectors at the ports of entry are ‘better positioned’ 
to identify intending immigrants, and we’re encouraged to leave that job to the INS.”88 
If the terrorists are not identified and intercepted by Consular Affairs officials 
abroad, then the responsibility of stopping terrorists falls squarely on the shoulders of 
U.S.-based immigration and customs officials.  Not only must these officials contend 
with the flood of 500 million people that cross U.S. borders at legal entry points and the 
500,000 or more that enter illegally, but they must also identify and intercept the few 
nefarious terrorists amongst these entrants:89  “If [the] first stage is overlooked [abroad], 
the screening at the border could lack focus and be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
dangerous travelers and materials.” 90   
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Consular Affairs officials enjoy the advantages of time, distance, manageable 
customer flows, and single-task responsibilities.  During the visa adjudication process, 
consular officers are not bound by the 45-second rule to admit visitors as U.S. customs 
and immigration officials are.  The temporary/nonimmigrant visa adjudication process 
can take from one day up to several weeks depending on the size, workload, and 
customer service/timeliness approach of the Consular Affairs post, the quality of the 
individual application, and each applicant’s circumstances91 (i.e., administrative 
processing and special clearances).92  Post-9/11, visa scrutiny levels have increased 
which has extended and slowed the adjudication process in some instances.  During the 
adjudication process, applicants will experience two waiting periods:  1) Wait Time for a 
Nonimmigrant Visa Interview Appointment and 2) Wait Time for a Nonimmigrant Visa 
To Be Processed.93  Due to travel facilitation, customer service, and diplomatic  
pressures, border immigration and customs officials are not encouraged to wait when 
processing visitors.   
The primary duty of Consular Affairs officials assigned to 265 consular posts94 is 
to issue visas to a markedly smaller legal population.  The total number of 
temporary/nonimmigrant visas issued in 2005 is 5,388,937, down from 7,588,778 in 
2001.95  If the terrorists pass the visa adjudication test, their next objective is to gain 
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entry at the U.S. border.  At the 327 border ports-of-entry96 and within the interior, 
immigration and customs inspectors and INS agents must perform a multitude of tasks 
that involve a significantly larger legal and illegal population totaling 500 million.  A visa 
does not constitute a free pass to enter the U.S.  A visa simply gives a foreign visitor 
permission to request entrance at a port-of-entry.  Foreign nationals are in conditional 
status until they are granted or refused entry.  Therefore, immigration and customs 
inspectors have crucial identification and interception responsibilities.97 
If terrorists slip past the overseas immigration and visa systems, U.S. immigration 
and customs inspectors may identify and intercept them at the border.  Terrorist 
interaction with trained border security officials constitutes yet another opportunity for 
identification and interception.  A second and perhaps third round of interviews 
conducted by primary and secondary inspectors can uncover a truer sense of terrorist 
intentions (i.e., student, visitor, business).  The officials can determine if the intentions, 
identity, duration of visit, and visa validity match the travel documents, financial support 
statements, and watchlist checks.98   
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Immigration personnel can also administer the foreign student visa compliance 
and entry-exit tracking systems.  These tracking systems can help identify those travelers 
who intend to or have violated the terms of their temporary/nonimmigrant visas.  Some 
visitors possessing temporary visas have travel patterns typified by frequent entries and 
exits:  “Many nonimmigrants, such as students, diplomats, and temporary workers, enter 
and leave the United States more than once each year.”99  Each entry-exit presents an 
opportunity for the U.S. to profit from investments in post-9/11 training of immigration, 
visa, and customs officials.  These newly anointed counterterrorism officials have a 
significant role to play.  Their training programs and guidance initiatives must now 
embrace their role as counterterror officials.  Intelligence and law enforcement 
communities must acknowledge this new role.  They must support these officials by 
sharing information and maintaining open communications.100 
This support will reinforce immigration officials’ counterterrorism training along 
with their ability to leverage SEVIS and NSEERS capabilities to disrupt terrorist 
travel/mobility.  Policy makers and immigration, visa, customs, and border security 
officials must decide if training, SEVIS, and NSEERS should be prioritized as 
counterterror measures and, therefore, receive the commensurate funding.  Schneier’s 
five-step model provides an assessment tool to determine how effective the three key 
recommendations are in mitigating the terrorist threat to the homeland.  The analysis and 
assessment that this thesis presents can assist them in their decision making.    
The U.S. cannot revert back to pre-9/11 levels of homeland security 
ineffectiveness characterized by “a legacy of poor management and low morale, 
exemplified by [the INS] sending out visa notification letters to two of the September 11 
hijackers [Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi]101 six months after the attacks.”102  
Assessments of the key recommendations will help to increase their effectiveness as 
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counterterror measures to stop terrorist entrance and to prevent terrorist attacks.  
Policymakers and officials can use the assessments to establish priorities and allocate 
resources for homeland security.   
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II. “HOME” AND “AWAY” GAME APPROACH 
This chapter offers a “home” and “away” game approach to disrupting terrorist 
travel/mobility.  Chapter II is comprised of four sections:  Aim/Objective, Key Players, 
Away Game:  United Nations Report and Strategy, and Home Game:  National 
Counterterrorism Strategies.   Chapter II opens with the aim/objective of three security 
solutions.  This aim/objective aligns with both multi- and unilateral counterterrorism 
strategies that validate and justify the three key recommendations.  In order to achieve 
this aim/objective and support these strategies, the three security solutions have been 
implemented to enhance security at legal entrances.  
The aim/objective section expounds upon the importance of disrupting terrorist 
travel/mobility and emphasizes identifying and intercepting terrorists abroad.  Stopping 
terrorists abroad or in-transit to the U.S. eases operational pressures for U.S. border 
officials by containing the terrorist threat to an overseas locale and at a distance.  
Combined efforts of U.S. Department of State Consular Affairs officials and domestic 
and international intelligence and law enforcement authorities abroad are indispensable to 
denying terrorist transit to and entrance into the U.S.  At the U.S. border, immigration 
and customs personnel must also have access to shared intelligence and law enforcement 
information to prevent terrorist entry.   
Preventing terrorist exploitation of immigration and visa systems abroad can be 
defined as an “away game.”  Domestic immigration and customs systems with the same 
aim/objective make up the closely connected “home game.”  In regards to the three 
security solutions, each approach is characterized by its key players.  Their effectiveness 
and success as counterterror officials are linked to their implementation of the three 
security solutions post-9/11.  Law enforcement and intelligence communities are key 
players in both away and home approaches.  Consular Affairs officials are key away 
game players.  Border customs and immigration inspectors are key home game players.  
Consular Affairs, immigration, and customs personnel must have current, standardized, 
and operational training and guidance to effectively leverage technologies such as SEVIS 
and NSEERS.  The current United Nations and U.S. counterterrorism strategies clearly 
illustrate the “away” and “home” game approach to disrupting terrorist travel and 
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mobility.  Their inclusion in the discussion is necessary to demonstrate how the three 
security solutions align with current multi- and unilateral strategies.  The multi- and 
unilateral strategies provide avenues to enhance international and domestic information 
sharing, coordination, and cooperation.   
A. AIM/OBJECTIVE OF THREE KEY SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
In the wake of 9/11, the United States implemented the three key immigration 
security solutions as prescribed in 9/11 and Terrorist Travel:  1) provide standardized 
operational training and additional guidance to immigration, visa, and customs personnel,            
2) establish a foreign student visa compliance and tracking system, the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System, (SEVIS), and  3) develop and implement the National Security 
Exit and Entry Registration System (NSEERS) with the aim of denying terrorist entry to 
prevent attacks upon its homeland.  Remaining in-country, or embedding, is also an 
important operational requirement for terrorists.  9/11 and Terrorist Travel asserts, 
THE SUCCESS OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 PLOT depended on the ability 
of the hijackers to obtain visas and pass an immigration and customs 
inspection in order to enter the United States.  It also depended on their 
ability to remain here undetected while they worked out the operational 
details of the attack.  If they had failed on either count—entering and 
becoming embedded—the plot could not have been executed.103 
Entering and embedding are facets of terrorist travel and mobility.  Disrupting terrorist 
travel/mobility forms the backbone of the three security solutions.     
Steven Camarota stresses that terrorist ability to attack is contingent upon U.S. 
ability to prevent their entry.  He emphasizes the critical role of the U.S. immigration 
system in enhancing the nation’s ability to identify and intercept terrorists emanating 
from abroad.104  In the post-9/11 threat environment, the U.S. homeland is now 
considered “fair game” in terrorist travel/mobility strategy.  Immigration, visa, and 
customs personnel, not the U.S. military, will be the first to encounter terrorists on the 
front lines of the overseas and border “perimeter.”105  These border security systems 
must adjust their target scopes.  Instead of targeting only illegal aliens, intending 
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immigrants, known criminals, and drug couriers,106 they must also hone in on terrorists.  
Key players must sharpen their skills in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating terrorist 
travel trends, techniques, tactics, and patterns.107   
Reinforcing this line of reasoning, the Migration Policy Institute published 
“Immigration and America’s Future:  A New Chapter” in September 2006.  It is an 
exhaustive 14-month study (same duration as 9/11 and Terrorist Travel research efforts) 
of immigration over time.  The report is the work of the Independent Task Force on 
Immigration.  The Task Force identifies “Security” as one of six challenges of the 
immigration system.  To bolster the security of the nation, the Task Force offers various 
recommendations.  Specifically, they align two goals which relate directly to this thesis.  
The first goal calls for the strengthening of immigration systems at legal ports-of-entry:   
As southwest border enforcement increases, incentives for individuals to 
use legal ports-of-entry to gain admittance to the United States will 
continue to grow.  Legal immigration admission procedures must not 
become ‘weak links’ in border protection.108   
Given the legal modes of entry of the 9/ll terrorists, heightened emphasis of and 
increased funding for securing legal entry points is warranted.  Implementation of the 
three security solutions is geared to enhance security at legal entrances.  As 9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel recommends, the three security solutions would also frustrate terrorist 
travel.  To accomplish this aim, the second goal advocates higher priority and resources 
for tracking and disrupting terrorist travel.109  The Task Force elaborates on these two 
goals with Recommendation #8 of the 16 that are offered: 
Terrorist tracking requires a distinct mindset and resource allocations, and 
it is dependent on vastly strengthened intelligence collection and analysis, 
information-sharing between agencies; upgraded travel documents and 
systems; vigorous law enforcement; and cooperation with foreign law 
enforcement and intelligence officials.110 
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B. KEY PLAYERS  
 Constraining terrorist mobility/travel by identifying the few terrorists from the 
many legitimate visitors is essential to preventing terrorist attacks.  To be successful, 
identification efforts must take place abroad and/or in-transit and at U.S. borders and/or 
within the country.  Teams of immigration, visa, customs, and border security systems 
are integral in an “away game” (exploit terrorist travel/mobility abroad or in-transit) and 
a “home game” (exploit terrorist travel/mobility by preventing terrorist entrance at the 
border and identify/intercept them post-entry) to preventing terrorist attacks against the 
U.S.  Key players figure prominently in both away and home games.  Specific players are 
instrumental to the implementation of the three security solutions.   
 Key players of the away game include:  the Department of State’s Consular 
Affairs officials and foreign and overseas-based domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement authorities.  To be effective, Consular Affairs officials must receive 
operational training.  Such training is developed from terrorist travel trends, techniques, 
tactics, and patterns that are collected and shared by intelligence and law enforcement 
authorities.  Nikolai Wenzel has termed the Department of State’s Consular Affairs 
“America’s other Border Patrol.”111  The visa filter function of Consular Affairs is 
important because the closer a terrorist gets to the U.S., it becomes more difficult to 
exclude him.  Consular officials can access the NSEERS database to check if applicants 
have violated the terms of their previous or current U.S. visas, or are “overstayers.”  
During the foreign student and exchange visitor visa adjudication processes, Consular 
Affairs officials will also access SEVIS to verify student enrollment in and acceptance to 
an educational institution.  These results of database queries will enhance the viability of 
their visa decisions.  By disapproving potential terrorists’ visa applications, consular 
officials not only deny visas, but they also deny terrorists entry into the U.S.   
 Once a terrorist is granted entry, the difficulty of identifying, finding, and 
removing him increases exponentially.112  Therefore, the home game features additional 
key players who have a role in stopping terrorist entry.  The first and most important 
phase of the home game encompasses the border.  The border consists of 327 air, sea, and 
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land ports-of-entry113 and the 7514-miles,114 or the stretches, between these ports-of-
entry.115  Key players at the ports-of-entry are trained CBP and USCIS inspectors.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, the second phase of the home game incorporates ICE 
personnel who administer and manage SEVIS and NSEERS.  The intelligence and law 
enforcement communities and their contributions are especially critical to success of the 
home game.  The stretches between ports-of-entry are staffed by the Border Patrol, Coast 
Guard, and the National Guard.  The stretches are typically the transit points for illegal 
immigration.  Since the focus of the thesis is the examination of terrorist entry through 
legal means, the stretches and its key players will not figure prominently in this thesis. 
The three security solutions are designed to help win both the away and home 
games.  The optimal objective is to prevent them from traveling to and entering the U.S. 
by beating them at the away game.  In doing so, the home game will not have to be 
played.  This away/home game continuum has been conceptualized and illustrated in the 
literature as the layered defense for domestic security,116 concentric circles,117 a multi-
tiered strategy,118 a system of systems,119 three layers of redundant immigration-
control,120 geographic zones,121 and/or screens.122  Yet, even the best-intentioned 
immigration, customs, and visa systems cannot stop terrorists from boarding international 
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flights bound for the U.S. with liquid explosives.  In this case, winning the away game 
will depend on the performance of the immigration and visa customs overseas-away team 
and international cooperation, law enforcement, and intelligence efforts.123  Information 
learned about the 9/11 terrorists provides the rationale: 
Al Qaeda’s hijackers were carefully chosen to avoid detection:  all but two 
were educated young men from middle-class families with no criminal 
records and no known connections to terrorism.  To apprehend such 
individuals before they attack requires a laser-like focus on the gathering, 
sharing, and analysis of intelligence, working hand-in-glove with well-
targeted criminal and immigration law enforcement.124 
Two strategies have been released recently that tie directly to the concepts of the “away” 
and “home” games.  The first strategy refers to the away game.  On 2 May 2006, the 
Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly for review entitled 
"Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy."  On 8 September 2006, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
was adopted by the Member States.  The second strategy relates to the home game.  The 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was released on 6 September 2006. 
C. AWAY GAME:  UNITED NATIONS REPORT AND STRATEGY  
The Secretary-General’s report consists of five major pillars/recommendations:   
1)  Dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it;   
2)  Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack;   
3)  Deterring States from supporting terrorism;   
4)  Developing State capacity to defeat terrorism; and 
5)  Defending human rights. 
Each recommendation is comprised of operational elements.  The second 
pillar/recommendation is “Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack.”  This 
recommendation has five operational elements.  The fourth operational element is 
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“Denying terrorist access to travel.”  The report expands upon this operational  
element, which has four specific proposals.125  
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy presents the U.N. 
resolution and the Plan of Action.  The Plan of Action is comprised of four measures:           
I.  Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, II.  Measures 
to prevent and combat terrorism, III.  Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and 
combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard, 
and IV.  Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law is the 
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.       
 The Action Plan’s second measure (II.  Measures to prevent and combat 
terrorism) has eighteen elements.  This measure and its elements are designed to “prevent 
and combat terrorism, in particular by denying terrorists access to the means to carry out 
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“62. Much of international terrorist activity still relies on physical movement - using regular 
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intercepting terrorists when attempting to cross borders. I urge Interpol to enhance its work on the database 
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with each other through the database and granting access to its law enforcement officials in the field, 
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64. Equally, we must strengthen the effectiveness of the travel ban under the sanctions regime against 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban, as it appears not to have been as effective as had been hoped. The Interpol-
United Nations Special Notices concerning people subject to the sanctions imposed by the Security Council 
regime against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their associates are a welcome development and Member States 
should distribute them widely to raise awareness and increase the effectiveness of the travel ban. I 
encourage the Security Council, and all Member States, to take necessary steps to further strengthen the 
travel ban.   
65. We must also work to strengthen border control, in particular in developing countries with long, 
poorly defined and often mountainous frontiers. Parts of the United Nations system, including the World 
Bank, have been working to support the reform and modernization of border management systems, 
facilities and institutions, at the national, regional and international levels. I urge further work in this area 
and highlight the need for political support within relevant countries to implement improved border 
management practices.” 
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their attacks, to their targets and to the desired impact of their attacks.”  Specifically, 
measures 13, 14, and 15 deal with border control, terrorist travel, and international 
information sharing.126  Above all else, “defence of human rights…[is] a fundamental 
pillar” that underlies the U.N. counter-terrorism strategy.  According to the U.N., the 
counter-terrorism away game does not consider its counter-terror measures as anathema 
to human rights.  The Secretary General’s report affirms that there is no trade-off of 
human rights for security.  In fact, ensuring security for humanity is the ultimate 
expression of human rights promotion.127  
D. HOME GAME:  NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES  
The most recent National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was released 5 
September 2006.  It outlines four short-term priorities of action that fall under the overall 
“Strategy for Winning the War on Terror.”  The first of the four priorities is “Prevent 
attacks by terrorist networks.”  It has three elements.  The second of the three elements is 
“Deny terrorist entry to the United States and disrupt their travel internationally”:   
Deny terrorists entry to the United States and disrupt their travel 
internationally.  Denying our enemies the tools to travel internationally 
and across and within our borders significantly impedes their mobility and 
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can inhibit their effectiveness.  They rely on illicit networks to facilitate 
travel and often obtain false identification documents through theft or in-
house forgery operations.  We will continue to enhance the security of the 
American people through a layered system of protections along our 
borders, at our ports, on our roadways and railways, in our skies, and with 
our international partners.  We will continue to develop and enhance 
security practices and technologies to reduce vulnerabilities in the 
dynamic transportation network, inhibit terrorists from crossing U.S. 
borders, and detect and prevent terrorist travel within the United States. 
Our efforts will include improving all aspects of aviation security; 
promoting secure travel and identity documents; disrupting travel 
facilitation networks; improving border security and visa screening; and 
building international capacity and improving international information 
exchange to secure travel and combat terrorist travel.  Our National 
Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel and our National Strategy for 
Maritime Security will help guide our efforts. 128   
The U.S. released another strategy, National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel 
(NSCTT), which melds together elements of the home and away games.  NSCTT is 
founded on the principle that constraining terrorist travel/mobility is a critical front in the 
War on Terror that is being waged abroad and at home.129  The National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCC) released the unclassified version of NSCTT on 2 May 
2006.  NSCTT submits a laundry list of initiatives implemented to counter terrorist travel 
and highlights challenges the U.S. faces in constraining terrorist mobility.  John Scott 
Redd, Director, NCC, also emphasizes in his cover letter that the initiatives should 
account for the protection of U.S. citizens’ civil liberties and should have limited impact 
on global trade.130  NSCTT also adds to post-9/11 terrorist travel dialogue.  The NCC’s 
strategy has two pillars:  Pillar I:  Enhance US and Foreign Partner Capabilities to 
Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas and Pillar II:  Deny Terrorists the Ability to Enter, 
Exit, and Travel Within the United States.131  Each of the two strategic pillars has three 
objectives:   
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• Pillar I 
o Strategic Objective 1:  Suppress Terrorists’ Ability to Cross 
International Borders 
o Strategic Objective 2:  Help Partner Nations Build Capacity to 
Limit Terrorist Travel 
o Strategic Objective 3:  Deny Terrorists Access to Resources 
That Facilitate Travel 
• Pillar II 
o Strategic Objective 1:  Inhibit Terrorists from Crossing US 
Borders 
o Enhance US Government Capabilities to Detect and Constrain 
Terrorist Travel Within the United States 
o Strengthen US Identity Verification Systems132 
 
To support the objectives, NCC highlights several initiatives that have been implemented.  
All three security solutions are made reference to amongst the two pillars, six strategic 
objectives, and fifty-four initiatives.  References to providing standardized operational 
training and additional guidance to immigration, visa, and customs personnel are many and 
varied.133  Training and guidance are highly valued and essential aspects of any multilateral 
or unilateral initiative targeted to constrain terrorist travel/mobility.   
NSCTT provides compelling examples of the implementation of many training 
initiatives.  Providing training and additional guidance is such a broad and diverse 
security solution which takes many forms in the post-9/11 security environment.  At its 
most basic level, training is a form of information sharing, communication, and 
distribution of knowledge.  Incorporating the latest terrorist travel techniques and 
disseminating best practices is indicative of a nascent system or program which 
characterizes the enhanced training efforts post-9/11.  In addition to the several training 
initiatives, NSCTT also presents one specific reference to the implementation of 
NSEERS and SEVIS:  “the ICE Compliance Enforcement Unit [CEU] oversees the 
generation and assignment of leads about individuals who have overstayed their visas or 
who have violated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration Program (NSEERS), 
[and] the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)” (Pillar II, Strategic 
Objective 2, Coordination and Sharing Between State and Local Law Enforcement).134  
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To reiterate, the three security solutions are designed to help win both the away 
and home games.  By each country winning their respective home game, then the win of 
the corresponding away games is more assured.  The Task Force relates how the games 
can be won by border and immigration team key players:   
[Terrorist] Mobility is an essential capability of terrorist organizations, 
often requiring terrorists to make contact with enforcement personnel at 
border crossings and other immigration processes.  These points of contact 
represent vulnerabilities the terrorists and opportunities for 
counterterrorism officials.135 
Immigration, visa, and customs personnel require standardized, current, operational 
training and additional guidance as well as technological tools such as SEVIS and NSEERS 
to effectively capitalize on opportunities to exploit terrorist travel/mobility vulnerabilities 
at the many points of contact with terrorists.  Points of contact occur abroad, at the U.S. 
border and within the interior.   
To fully capitalize on opportunities and to exploit vulnerabilities in terrorist 
travel/mobility abroad,  terrorists must be identified and intercepted as far away from the 
U.S. as possible.  By implementing the three key recommendations, the U.S. can “push 
out” 136 its borders and save time, money, and lives.  Pushing out U.S. borders requires 
that the Department of State Consular Affairs embrace its role as “America’s Other 
Border Patrol.”137  To fulfill this role, Consular Affairs must have domestic and 
international law enforcement, intelligence, immigration, visa, and customs information 
sharing, coordination, and cooperation.  Chapter II offered a “home” and “away” game 
approach.  The “home” and “away” game approach explains how the three key 
recommendations align and support multi- and unilateral counterterrorism strategies that 
are designed to disrupt terrorist travel/mobility abroad, at the border, and in-country.  The 
multi- and unilateral strategies provide resolutions and provisions to enhance  
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international and domestic information sharing, coordination, and cooperation.  
Therefore, these counterterrorism strategies support and enable Consular Affairs in its 
role as “America’s Other Border Patrol.” 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THREE KEY SECURITY 
SOLUTIONS 
Chapter II demonstrated that post-9/11 implementation of the recommendations is 
justified and validated by both multi- and unilateral counterterrorism strategies.  
Implementation of the three security solutions was directed and mandated post-9/11.  
9/11 was a catalyst for the immense political, bureaucratic, and legislative response that 
ensued.  Therefore, the policy directives and legislative mandates that have prescribed 
these policy options deserve mentioning.  Chapter III will describe post-9/11 
implementation of the three key recommendations/security solutions for immigration: 1) 
provide standardized operational training and additional guidance to immigration, visa, 
and customs personnel, 2) establish SEVIS, and 3) develop and implement NSEERS.   
This analysis spans the five year period following the events of 9/11.  This analysis will 
be used to develop an assessment of the three key recommendations.  This assessment 
will be presented in Chapter IV. 
Pre-9/11 immigration, visa, and customs systems were characterized by a general 
lack of counterterrorism focus.  Implementation of the key post-9/11 recommendations 
offers the U.S. opportunities to enhance homeland security by exploiting terrorist travel 
and mobility vulnerabilities.  By leveraging the capabilities of trained home and away 
game key players, SEVIS, and NSEERS, the U.S. may be able to effectively degrade 
terrorist ability to travel, to enter the U.S., and to perpetrate attacks.   
A. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE MANDATES 
Post-9/11, a Presidential directive and several legislative mandates have called for 
the implementation of the three key security solutions.  The directive and mandates offer 
provisions aimed at capitalizing on opportunities to exploit terrorist travel/mobility 
abroad and at home.  The many resolutions will be introduced in this section, highlighting 
the crucial role of the away game and its consular key players.   
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act classifies the entry-
exit and foreign student tracking systems as tools required to intercept terrorists abroad 
and at the border.  The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 also included a provision (Section 
40 
416) to fully implement the foreign student visa tracking system and to “strengthen the 
monitoring aspect” by 1 January 2003.138  The post-9/11 legislation also requested the 
implementation of an integrated entry-exit system (Section 414).139  The Act authorized 
law enforcement data sharing with consular officers to enhance the security emphasis of 
visa decisions (Section 403).  Section 414 of the Act pertains to Visa Integrity and 
Security which conveys the importance of the away game and the crucial duty of consular 
officers.140  Consular officers who have access to law enforcement information may be 
able to deny potential terrorists visas and, therefore, deny terrorist admission to the U.S. 
Training mandates do appear in other post-9/11 statutory imperatives such as the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 
Reform Act of 2002.  Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act mandates consular 
officer training and confers enormous homeland security authorities and responsibilities 
on them.141  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also contained a provision (Section 
442) related to SEVIS, yet the Act made no mention of an entry-exit system.142   
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 directed 
improvements “to the visa issuance process abroad and immigration inspections at the 
border.”143  It is the one piece of legislation that has mandated all three key 
recommendations.  Training regimen enhancements (Sections 101 and 305), an integrated 
entry-exit system initiative (Section 302),144 and the establishment of an electronic means 
to monitor and verify the status of students and exchange visitors (Section 501) were 
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among its many provisions.145  Specifically, the Act increased access to information and 
enhanced training for overseas consular key players (Sections 305 and 202).146  The 
legislation also authorized the commensurate funds for such information sharing 
technologies and training on the use of these technologies.  In addition to shared law 
enforcement and intelligence information, consular officials would also use the integrated 
entry-exit system to screen visa applicants.147 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 will round out the 
directive and legislative mandate discussion.  TITLE VII of the Act is aptly entitled “911 
Commission Implementation Act of 2004.”  Subtitle A of TITLE VII “implements 9/11 
Commission recommendations regarding the importance of using all elements of national 
power…to win the war on terror.”148  Counterterrorism, standardized, and operational 
training and a biometric entry-exit system are among the recommendations implemented 
by this post-9/11 legislation.  The recommendations are mandated by Subtitle B 
“Terrorist Travel and Effective Screening,” Sections 7201 (Counterterrorist Travel 
Intelligence) and 7208 (Biometric Entry and Exit Data System).149  Based on 9/11 
Commission recommendations, immigration and consular personnel training must 
encompass terrorist travel patterns, trends, practices, and tactics that would be derived 
from intelligence and law enforcement information collection, analysis, and 
dissemination.150  The National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCC) unclassified version of 
the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel (NSCTT) released on 2 May 2006 and 
discussed in the previous chapter was mandated by Subtitle A of this Act.  The NSCTT 
was to reflect this new focus on disrupting terrorist travel/mobility.  The strategy covers 
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the development of Terrorist Travel (Section 7215) and Training Programs (Section 
7201) which were also mandated by the Act.151   
The legislation also contains specific provisions that emphasize the crucial role of 
consular officials and their anti-fraud and cross training.  Section 7203 (Responsibilities 
and Functions of Consular Officers) authorized the Secretary of State to hire an 
additional 150 consular officers each fiscal year from 2006 through 2009.152  Consular 
officer training enhancements were also specified:  “In accordance with section 7201(d) 
of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004, and as part of the consular training 
provided to such officers by the Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive 
training in detecting fraudulent documents and general document forensics and shall be 
required as part of such training to work with immigration officers conducting 
inspections of applicants for admission into the United States at ports of entry.’’153  To 
supplement hiring increases and training enhancements, the Act also “ensures that there 
will be at least one full-time anti-fraud specialist at all high-fraud diplomatic and consular 
posts where visas are issued unless there is a full-time employee of the Department of 
Homeland Security assigned to such post pursuant to Section 428 of the Homeland 
Security Act [of 2002].”154   
The Act underscores the importance of the away game and promotes international 
information exchange in Section 7210:  “Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following 
findings:  (1) The exchange of terrorist information with other countries, consistent with 
privacy requirements, along with listings of lost and stolen passports, will have 
immediate security benefits [and] (2) The further away from the borders of the United 
States that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United States will gain.”155  
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Emphasizing the away game approach enables the U.S. to “push out our borders” by 
“increase[ing] the screening of threatening individuals before they reach the U.S.”156 
Pre-9/11 immigration, visa, and customs systems did not have a counterterrorism 
focus or role.  These systems were designed, postured, and operated to prevent the entry 
of illegal aliens, known criminals, intending immigrants, and drug smugglers.  Concerns, 
priorities, and funding to prevent their entry far outweighed those of countering terror.  
There is no assurance that directives and legislative mandates with a counterterror 
emphasis would have produced different results on 9/11.  Preventing terrorists from 
traveling to, entering the U.S., and attacking the homeland was not a priority.  Amidst 
more pressing political, social, and economic concerns such as illegal immigration, it is 
not surprising that immigration, visa, and customs policies and mandates did not 
emphasize countering the terrorist threat.  
The immediate post-9/11 legislation was enacted in response to intense political 
and public reactions to executed terrorist attacks against the U.S.  Once the initial shock 
and the response fervor wore off, the political will and emphasis also withered away until 
reemerging political and public concerns and fears about the next attack would prompt 
reinvigoration, expansion, and reemphasis of the three key recommendations.  Although 
well-intentioned, the immediate post-9/11 legal imperatives were seemingly based on 
hindsight and damage control.  Each successive policy directive or legal mandate called 
for a reinvigoration and/or expansion of the key recommendations.  The legislative 
process has been a learning process.  With the passage of time, lessons can be learned and 
assessments can be derived in respect to the mandated and implemented policies.  This 
thesis offers such an assessment.   
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THREE KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Training and Additional Guidance 
Information regarding pre-9/11 immigration, visa, and customs systems 
gaps/weaknesses is scattered throughout the literature.  9/11 and Terrorist Travel, is the 
most informative and comprehensive source for explanations of these gaps/weaknesses. 
The report captures the state of pre-9/11 training and guidance efforts and covers a span 
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of more than twenty years.  The post-9/11 training and guidance discussion spans five 
years, yet 9/11 and Terrorist Travel only covers a small portion of that time.  Additional 
information regarding post-9/11 training and guidance efforts is scattered throughout the 
literature.  Such an arrangement is fitting given the nonstandardized and decentralized 
nature of training and guidance efforts.  Each agency of the sprawling U.S. 
bureaucracy—INS, Department of State, Customs Service, CIA, and FBI--was 
responsible for its own training program.  In particular, the INS’ pre-9/11 training and 
guidance efforts would not reflect a counterterrorism role:  “Neither the INS nor others in 
government ever viewed the agency as having a pivotal role in preventing terrorist entry 
into the United States.”157   
 In the five years since 9/11, implementation of post-9/11 training and guidance 
efforts has been piecemeal and decentralized.  Capturing all the individual and/or 
collective agency initiatives that have been implemented in the five years since 9/11 is 
challenging.  Post-9/11 training and guidance assessment data is also disparate, diverse, 
and challenging to capture.  The training and additional guidance programs that were 
implemented responded to the pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses identified by the 9/11 
Commission.  Deficiencies in pre-9/11 inspector, counterterrorism, primary and 
secondary inspection, document fraud, and database training programs were 
acknowledged, and attempts to address the gaps/weaknesses are evident.  For the most 
part, recommendations calling for operational, standardized, and continuing 
counterterrorism training and additional guidance have been fulfilled.  Training and 
additional guidance must be based on current and sustained law enforcement and 
intelligence information.  This information must be shared with immigration, visa, and 
customs officials.  This section presents an overview of the myriad of post-9/11 training 
and guidance implementation efforts.   
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act of 2002 mandated the implementation of training and guidance efforts.  
Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act mandates counterterrorism, operational, 
language, and cross consular training and vests consular officials with homeland security 
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authority and responsibility.158  The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act of 2002 authorized the most training initiatives and programs compared to the other 
legislative mandates.  These specific sections will be presented.  Sections 101 (a), (c), and 
(d) authorized funding for additional hiring and ongoing training of personnel to secure 
the U.S. northern and southern borders.159  The Attorney General obtained approval to 
hire, at minimum, 200 INS inspectors, 200 investigative personnel, and their associated 
support staffs in each of the fiscal years 2003 through 2006.160  Section 101(c) 
appropriated resources for ongoing training of INS officials along the border, continued 
cross-training of border personnel with other agencies, and training of immigration 
officers in the use of lookout databases and the monitoring of passenger traffic.   
Section 101(d) also allocated funds for and directed the Secretary of State to 
“implement enhanced security measures for the review of visa applicants, to adequately 
staff the facilities and programs associated with such reviews, and to provide ongoing 
training for consular officers and diplomatic security agents to carry out this mandate.”161  
An entire section is dedicated to the training of consular away game key players.  Section 
305 specifically calls for consular officer training regimen enhancements.  This provision 
requires that consular officials receive “specific training in identifying inadmissible 
aliens, in interagency and international intelligence sharing regarding terrorism, and in 
cultural sensitivity toward visa applications.”  This section also directs federal law 
enforcement and intelligence communities to share information with consular officials 
charged with screening visa applicants.  Toward this end, funds were authorized “as 
necessary to implement these requirements.”162   
To bolster security efforts abroad, Section 304 relates to the establishment of 
terrorist lookout committees at each visa-issuing embassy or consulate.  The committees 
were designed to utilize consulate resources to identify terrorists by collecting and 
analyzing terrorist information.  The committees would also perform their lookout 
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function by alerting the appropriate consular officials of suspected terrorists.  The 
committees would provide additional manpower and oversight capabilities by ensuring 
the names of suspected terrorists are loaded into the various lookout databases.163  This 
section also requires consular officers receive operational training to enhance their 
identification of terrorists and other threats.164  Section 305 affirms that the effectiveness 
of an enhanced training regimen is reliant upon law enforcement information and 
intelligence shared with consular officers responsible for screening visa applicants.165   
Immigration, visa, and customs training enhancements would be bolstered by 
Section 403 which is intended to mitigate the travel facilitation culture, environment, and 
pressures that the personnel have grappled with.  This section repeals Section 286(g) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986 which mandated that the INS complete 
inspection of arriving passengers within 45 minutes of their arrival at U.S. ports of 
entry.166  To accommodate this inspection time extension, the INS was required to fully 
staff ports of entry at adequate levels to handle customer flow and meet inspection time 
requirements.  Above all else, the safety and security of the U.S. should not be 
compromised.167  Finally, Sections 5301, 5302, 5303, and 5304 of Subtitle C, entitled 
Visa Requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
contains various provisions for additional visa adjudication processes such as:  in-person 
interviews of visa applicants, visa application requirements, effective dates, and 
revocation of visas and other travel documentation.168   
In its quest to improve odds of winning the away game, the Department of State 
has enhanced its basic consular course.  On 17 October 2003, the Department lengthened 
its formal consular course (ConGen) from 26 to 31 days.  The curriculum was expanded 
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to include lessons on visa security, counterterrorism awareness, and interviewing 
techniques.  Two days of the course are devoted to teaching methods to identify fraud and 
deception by applicants, a half-day counterterrorism program hosted at CIA headquarters, 
and a module on terrorist travel patterns.169  As counterterror measures, standardized, 
operational training and guidance initiatives and programs are supplemented by the 
implementation of SEVIS and NSEERS.   
2. SEVIS  
The 9/11 Commission Report and specifically 9/11 and Terrorist Travel identify a 
multitude of pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses of the border system architecture which attributed 
to the failings of U.S. immigration, customs, and visa systems.  Along with training 
deficiencies, other gaps/weaknesses contributed to the occurrence of 9/11.  9/11 and 
Terrorist and Travel argues that two efforts would have armed consular officials and 
inspectors with crucial counterterrorism information—a system to track foreign student 
visa compliance and a program to track temporary/nonimmigrant visitors’ entry to and 
exit from the United States.  These two programs would have enhanced the 
counterterrorism focus of visa and admissibility decisions.170  SEVIS and NSEERS 
would be implemented to provide crucial counterterrorism information.   
This thesis focuses on three pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses and the recommendations 
prescribed to address them.  The remaining two gaps/weaknesses are:   ineffective foreign 
student visa compliance and nonexistent entry-exit system.  9/11 Commission research 
efforts led to a pivotal public hearing statement.  This statement corroborates the 
gaps/weaknesses findings of this thesis.  The 9/11 Commission’s seventh public hearing 
was held January 26 - 27, 2004 in Washington, D.C.  The two-day investigative hearing 
developed facts and circumstances relating to border security.  Susan Ginsberg, Senior 
Counsel to the Commission, highlighted the need for SEVIS and NSEERS to address two 
pernicious pre-9/11 gaps/weaknesses:  “Two programs might have helped detect such 
violations.  One dealt with violations of student status.  The other dealt with 
overstays.”171  If foreign student compliance/tracking and entry-exit systems were in-
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place and in working order pre-9/11, these and other student status and overstay violators 
could have been detected.  Providing standardized operational training and guidance to 
personnel could have enabled them to leverage the capability of such systems.   
9/11 and Terrorist Travel asserts, “As early as 1972, the INS was concerned that 
some foreign students could pose a threat to national security.”172  To address these 
concerns post-9/11, a Presidential directive was published, and legislative mandates were 
enacted.  Seven weeks after the events of 9/11, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
2 (HSPD-2) with subject line “Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies” was 
released on 29 October 2001.  One of the six policy areas of HSPD-2 is “Abuse of 
International Student Status.”  HSPD-2 mandated the implementation of measures to end 
the abuse of student visas.  The program was to track the status of foreign students who 
receive visas.  Pertinent information about the student should be collected:   the proposed 
major course of study, the status of the individual as a full-time student, the classes in 
which the student enrolls, and the source of the funds supporting the student’s 
education.173 
Section 416 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 directed the expansion of the 
foreign student tracking/monitoring program to include other approved educational 
institutions (i.e., flight, language training vocational schools).174  It authorized $36.8 
million in appropriations to fund this expansion.175  Section 416 mandated that the INS 
have the foreign student tracking system established and running by 1 January 2003.176  
Section 501 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 covers 
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the foreign student tracking system.  This provision requires schools to notify the INS 
when a student has failed to report for school more than 30 days after the registration 
deadline for classes.177  This provision instructs the collection of additional data to 
include:  1) the student’s date and port of entry, dates of school enrollment and when the 
student departs school (e.g., graduates, quits), and the student’s degree program or field 
of study.178 
Section 501 also established an interim system to be used until the full program 
was implemented.  Under the temporary system, the State Department was prohibited 
from issuing student visas until 1) the agency received electronic evidence of acceptance 
from an approved academic or other institution and 2) the consular officer adequately 
reviewed the applicant’s visa record.  Once a visa is issued, the Secretary of State must 
transmit to the INS notice that the visa has been issued, the INS must notify the academic 
institution that the alien has been admitted to the U.S., and the institution must notify the 
INS no later than 30 days after the class registration deadline should the alien fail to 
enroll.  In addition, within 30 days of enactment, the INS must provide the State 
Department with a list of approved institutions authorized to receive immigrants.179     
SEVIS became operational for foreign students on 15 February 2003.180  SEVIS 
is a computerized process designed to collect, maintain, and manage foreign student and 
exchange visitor data.  SEVIS replaced a manual, paperwork-intensive process.  SEVIS 
leverages technology by allowing real time, accurate data to be updated and maintained 
through a web-based application.  Throughout foreign students’ and exchange visitors’ 
stays in the U.S., schools and exchange program administrators “transmit electronic 
information and event notifications” to DHS and the Department of State via the 
Internet.181  By populating SEVIS with data, DHS, DOS, schools, and exchange 
programs enable SEVIS to identify students who have violated the terms of their foreign 
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student or exchange visitor visas.182  The challenge of tracking students which comprise 
about 10.5% of the total nonimmigrant issuances is expanded to include the entire 
nonimmigrant population.  NSEERS would be implemented to track all 
nonimmigrant/temporary visa holders. 183   
3. NSEERS 
In May 2002, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft mandated the development of 
“an entry-exit registration system at selected ports of entry.”184  On 5 June 2002, the U.S. 
Department of Justice offered a proposal for a National Security Exit and Entry 
Registration System, or NSEERS.  Attorney General Ashcroft remarked that NSEERS is 
a first step on the road to developing a congressionally mandated entry-exit system to 
track nearly all foreign visitors.185  On 13 June 2002, INS proposed a measure to 
implement NSEERS on 13 June 2002.  The final provision was issued on 12 August 
2002.186  INS implemented NSEERS on the one year anniversary of 9/11.187   
The sheer number of nonimmigrant/temporary visa categories, the overwhelming 
volume of entries and admissions, and the lack of data on the actual number of visa 
“overstayers,” complicate the job of tracking the entry and exit of U.S. visitors.  Adding 
to this daunting task of tracking visitors are the numerous categories of nonimmigrant 
visas and the different interpretations of visa issuance and admission.  Jeanne Batalova 
informs that there are more than seventy classes of temporary/nonimmigrant visas.188  
Nonimmigrant visa issuance and admission/entry statistics can be counted and interpreted 
in different ways.  These disparities can be attributed to the differences in operating 
procedures that exist between the visa-issuing agency, Department of State, and the 
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visitor-screening agency, Department of Homeland Security.  Therefore, confusion arises 
in regards to who should be counted, who has arrived and granted entry, and who has 
exited the U.S.189   
The existence of different methods adds to the confusion surrounding and 
contributes to the lack of accounting of nonimmigrant entries/exits.  This confusion and 
lack of accounting add to the arguments for the student and entry-exit tracking systems.  
Student, diplomat, and temporary worker nonimmigrants enter and leave the U.S. more 
than once in a give year. Each entry and departure is documented separately with the 
issuance of an I-94 Form.  Given this data collection procedure, temporary/nonimmigrant 
visitors may enter more than once in given year.  This causes the number of 
admissions/entries to exceed the number of applicants issued nonimmigrant visas.190  All 
of these accounting challenges reveal and contribute to the problematic lack of 
nonimmigrant overstay tracking.   
Prescribed as a solution, NSEERS requires that a subgroup of nonimmigrants 
“register with immigration authorities either at a port of entry or a designated ICE office 
in accordance with the special registration procedures.”  This subset of nonimmigrants 
subject to special registration procedures would register at specially designated ports 
when leaving the U.S.  They must report in-person to an immigration officer at the 
designated port on their departure date.191  The Department of Justice estimated that 
NSEERS would account for about 100,000 visitors in its first year of implementation.192  
The basic design, intent, and purpose of the entry-exit and foreign student tracking 
provisions of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002  are 
similar to what was mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 414).193  The intent 
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and purpose of NSEERS is to “cover arriving nonimmigrants from [twenty-five] 
designated countries, as well as other arriving nonimmigrants who are determined to pose 
an elevated national security risk.”194 
9/11 and Terrorist Travel reports that NSEERS was implemented in phases.  On 
11 September 2002, INS inspectors (now CBP inspectors post-9/11), were required to 
register nonimmigrant foreign nationals applying for admission to the U.S. who were 
citizens of the five state sponsors of terrorism:  Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Syria.195  
One month later, all ports of entry would have the new registration database and 
equipment installed.  According to the internal INS memo, effective 1 October 2002, 
inspectors were also required to register nonimmigrant males between 16 and 45 years of 
age who were citizens of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.196  Several other Federal 
Register notices were published and each one would add to the list of countries that 
required registration of its male nonimmigrant population.  On 22 November and 18 
December 2002 and 21 February 2003, published notices also required registration of 
nonimmigrant male citizens or nationals from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, 
Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait.197   
When nonimmigrant males from the selected countries arrive the U.S. to request 
entry, they are subject to special registration requirements.  First, they are screened 
against the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) by inspectors at ports of entry.  
If an alien applying for entry is identified by IBIS as being subject to NSEERS 
registration, the alien is referred to secondary inspection for NSEERS registration 
processing.  In the secondary inspection, they are fingerprinted, photographed, and 
checked against four databases of known criminals and terrorists.  They provide personal 
information (e.g., biography, employment, school, intended address in the U.S., points of 
contact, and credit card information)198 and their plans and intentions while in-country.   
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The original provisions of NSEERS required aliens to register at a port of entry 
for 30-day and annual re-registrations.  This rule was amended on 2 December 2003, 
which suspended the automatic 30-day and annual registration requirements.199  If 
remaining in-country more than 30 days, they were required to appear at an immigration 
office between day 30 and day 40 to verify visa compliance, proof of residence, and 
school enrollment.  To close the entry-exit loop, special registrants must report their exit 
at the port of departure when exiting the U.S.200   
NSEERS is part of a family of post-9/11 tracking systems that include US-VISIT 
(US Visitor and Information Status Indication Technology) and SEVIS.  They are 
designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of terrorist travel and mobility.  Their 
implementation affords the U.S. basic accounting and tracking measures of legal visitors, 
both benign and potentially malignant.  Eventually, US-VISIT will subsume the functions 
of the NSEERS program.201  This fact is the basis for DHS’s rationale to amend the 
original rules of NSEERS:   
In the supplementary information…DHS offered several reasons why the 
suspension of the automatic re-registration requirements is appropriate and 
advantageous.  It indicated that there are other tracking systems, including 
US-VISIT and SEVIS, that can help ensure that NSEERS registrants 
remain in compliance with the terms of their visas and admissions.  In 
addition, DHS stated that suspending the 30-day and annual registration 
requirements “will reduce the burden on those required to register under 
current regulations, as well as to DHS.”202   
Chapter III has presented the post-9/11 implementation of the three key security 
solutions.  The security solutions were implemented to stop terrorists from traveling and 
entering the U.S.  Implementation of the three security solutions was directed and 
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mandated post-9/11 by a Presidential directive and several legislative mandates.  The 
events of 9/11 caused a political, bureaucratic, and legislative stir, resulting in the 
publishing of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2) and the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, and the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.  The directive and legislative mandates 
give immigration, visa, and customs systems a counterterrorism focus and confer 
homeland security responsibilities upon them.  The preceding analysis of current policy 
prescription and implementation covers the five-year period following the September 11 
attacks.  This analysis will be used to develop an assessment of the three key 
recommendations.  Implementing training and guidance efforts for home and away game 
key players allows them to leverage the capabilities of other implemented security 
solutions such as SEVIS and NSEERS.  Through the implementation of the three security 
solutions, the U.S. may be able to effectively degrade terrorist ability to travel, to enter 
the U.S., and to perpetrate attacks.  An assessment of the effectiveness of the 
recommendations to achieve this aim/objective will be presented in the following chapter. 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF THREE KEY SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
Assessing the post-9/11 implementation of the three recommendations is essential 
for homeland security prioritization and resource allocation.  Analysis of their 
effectiveness as counterterror measures should impact the decisions of policymakers, 
immigration, visa, customs, and border security officials.  Assessments that analyze their 
ability to prevent terrorist entry are valuable and needed.  Such assessments will help 
decision makers determine if the key recommendations should be given the appropriate 
priority and receive the commensurate funding.   
Schneier’s five-step model presents a method to analyze the three key 
recommendations:  1) provide standardized operational training and additional guidance 
to immigration, visa, and customs personnel, 2) establish SEVIS, and 3) develop and 
implement NSEERS.  The five steps of Schneier’s model are as follows:    
Step 1:  What assets are you trying to protect? 
Step 2:  What are the risks to these assets? 
Step 3:  How well does the security solution mitigate the risk? 
Step 4:  What other risks does the security solution cause? 
Step 5:  What trade-offs does the security solution require?203 
This model was applied to assess the post-9/11 implementation and effectiveness 
of the three recommendations, or “security solutions.”  In regards to the three key 
recommendations, the answers to questions 1. and 2. of Schneier’s model are the same 
and will not be restated in the subsequent assessments: 
Step 1:  What assets are you trying to protect?                                                                                  
America (its citizens and noncitizens, critical infrastructure, economy, morale) 
Step 2:  What are the risks to these assets?                                                                                   
Terrorists enter the U.S., and they target America for attack. 
By consulting experts from various fields, answers to questions 3, 4, and 5 of Schneier’s 
model will be derived.  These answers will form the assessments of the three key 
recommendations and will be used to develop Chapter IV.  Chapter IV ends with the 
conclusion of this thesis.     
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A. SCHNEIER’S 5-STEP MODEL:  ASSESSING SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
1. Training and Guidance  
Step 3:  How well does the security solution mitigate the risk?   
Training is one of the critical counterterror measures that may stop terrorists from 
entering and attacking the U.S.  In addition to the 9/11 Commission, the U.N., NCC, 
Center for Immigration Studies, National Immigration Forum, Immigration Policy 
Center, Migration Policy Institute, GAO, CRS, Janice Kephart, Mark Krikorian, Michael 
O’Hanlon, et al., Doris Meissner, Margaret Stock and Benjamin Johnson, Jay Carafano, 
Richard Stana, and Deborah Waller Meyers advocate training and additional guidance as 
a security solution.  Conversely, the overabundance of advocates is not matched by 
sources that provide implementation progress and effectiveness assessments of training 
and guidance programs.  Therefore, forging a direct link between enhanced training and 
guidance efforts and stopping terrorist entrance is challenging.   
The many advocates discuss the gaps/weaknesses of pre-9/11 immigration, visa, 
and customs training programs and proclaim that the programs should have a 
counterterrorism focus.  Post-9/11, immigration, visa, and customs personnel are now 
viewed as having a counterterrorism role.  The lessons of 9/11 advised that terrorists will 
try to exploit legal, temporary/nonimmigrant systems.  Therefore, training and guidance 
programs that relate to these systems were enhanced, and the scrutiny of applicants and 
their documents was intensified.204  Immigration, customs, and visa personnel will now 
be held accountable for their visa-issuing and admissibility-screening decisions.  Their 
decisions depend on the quality, timeliness, and currency of shared intelligence and law 
enforcement information.  Intelligence and law enforcement entities should share in the 
successes and failures of visa and admission decisions.205   
Terrorists applying for visas and requesting entry will encounter better trained 
immigration, visa, and customs personnel who are newly anointed counterterrorism 
officials.  The possibility of being identified and intercepted by officials who enforce 
immigration, visa, and custom law and policy may deter terrorists and prevent their 
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entry.206  Terrorists desiring to travel to the U.S. may opt to not take the risks associated 
with the many points of contact that occur with trained immigration, visa, and customers 
personnel (i.e., applying for visas, requesting entry, and registering with ICE and 
educational institutions).207   
The missions of potential terrorists will be disrupted if they do not initiate the 
travel process.  Trained customs officials may frustrate the travel plans of terrorists and 
render their exploitation of legal, nonimmigrant methods unsuccessful by refusing to 
issue visas to applicants.  For example, 2005 nonimmigrant visa refusal rates convey that 
consular officials who screen applicants with counterterror lenses and a security focus 
can apply higher levels of scrutiny.  Out of a total of 7,358,122 nonimmigrant visa 
applications received in 2005, 1,969,185 applications were refused.208  Terrorist grounds 
resulted in 104 refusals.209  Although the refusal rate for terrorist grounds comprises a 
small percentage of the total number of refusals, every refusal is noteworthy and signifies 
one less terrorist entry and one averted terrorist attack.  One only point out that 19 
hijackers caused enormous devastation on 9/11.  Continuing to track and document rates 
of and grounds for refusal is critical.  This data validates the effectiveness of consular 
training and trained officials’ ability to prevent terrorist entry.  Refusal rates and rationale 
data was not collected in 2001 or 2002.  2003 was the first year refusal rate data was 
compiled.210  2005 was the first year grounds for refusal data was documented.211   
Training is very much an internal process.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
organizations, especially the newly established DHS organizations, would not publicize 
their training efforts, or lack thereof, because validating training’s mitigation effects on 
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terrorism is a complex challenge for leadership.  Training just does not carry the fire 
power and prestige for border security that the deployment of National Guard troops to 
the border engenders.  One source attempts to fill this void:  GAO Report, “Border 
Security:  Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and 
Information Sharing.”212  
The GAO reports on Department of State visa processes and procedures, staffing, 
and counterterrorism training of consular officers.  The study is an extension of a 2002 
GAO study and assesses progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 
2002.  The Department of State increased hiring of consular officers and modified 
consular training by giving it a counterterrorism focus.213  GAO recommended that the 
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security:  “ensure that consular sections have the 
necessary tools to enhance national security and promote legitimate travel, including 
effective human resources and training.”214  The GAO report did not provide hard 
evidence linking training program enhancements to preventing terrorists from traveling to 
or entering the U.S.  Again, consular rates of and terrorist grounds for nonimmigrant visa 
refusal serve as the best measure to gauge the effectiveness of consular training and the 
ability of consular officials to prevent terrorist entry.   
Consular officers overseas are empowered by the comparative advantage they 
leverage as the first line of defense in the “away game.”  By virtue of their distant 
locations, they can effectively stop terrorists from entering the U.S. by denying them 
visas and preventing them from traveling to the U.S. homeland.  They must have the most 
current, comprehensive training programs to identify and intercept terrorists attempting to 
travel to the U.S.  Distance is a powerful buffer against terrorist attacks, and trained 
consular officers are integral to enforcing this critical U.S. buffer zone.  Regardless of 
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location or distance, all immigration, visa, and customs officials have an ever-increasing 
role to play in protecting the U.S. against terrorist entrance.  Their training must be 
current, frequent, validated, and publicized.  Without proper training, other 
countermeasures that are utilized by these officials (i.e., SEVIS and NSEERS) will be 
less effective in mitigating terrorist entrance into the U.S.215 
Step 4:  What other risks does the security solution cause?    
Training is the most benign security solution and does not carry with it substantial 
risks.  Trained immigration, visa, and customs personnel may cause risks for legitimate 
travelers who must apply for visas and request admission into the U.S.216  By scrutinizing 
applicants and their documents for indications of terrorism/terrorist ties, consular 
officials, border inspectors, and immigration enforcement personnel might also frustrate 
the travel of well-intentioned and valid travelers.  Counterterrorism trained and focused 
personnel may also miss opportunities to identify and intercept illegal aliens, known 
criminals, intending immigrants, and drug smugglers when most of their attention, time, 
and effort is devoted to rooting out terrorists.  Since training and guidance programs must 
be developed and updated with current and shared intelligence and law enforcement 
information, risks of compromising sensitive information, sources, and methods of 
collection are evident.  The possibility of such sensitive information getting into 
unauthorized hands is a valid concern.217  There are also certain risks that frustrate 
training and guidance efforts.  The literature shows that there is a tendency for the U.S. to 
increase the number of bureaucratic organizations, laws and policies, and personnel.  
However, little regard is paid to the training of recently-hired or incumbent personnel 
who comprise the newly-formed organizations.  The personnel receive insufficient 
training in current laws and policies.218   
These personnel must be empowered with technology and databases that are 
utilized, shared, and monitored.  With the resources that have been allocated to the 
immigration, visa, and customs systems--the first line of defense--the U.S. must ensure 
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the most important resource—the people--on the front line of the first line of defense are 
trained to follow the already established law and policy.219  To make the training 
effective, complex immigration and visa law and policies demand reform and 
simplification.  Realistic, simpler immigration and visa policy are important to enhance 
personnel understanding, application, and enforcement.220  The complexity of the laws is 
compounded by their sheer numbers.  Immigration related border security legislation in 
the 109th Congress totaled 53.221 
Step 5:  What trade-offs does the security solution require?   
The exponential benefits of implementing training and additional guidance 
initiatives such as consular training program enhancements designed to prevent terrorist 
entry into the U.S. far outweigh their relatively low economic, social, and political costs.  
To reiterate, out of a total of 7,358,122 nonimmigrant visa applications received in 2005, 
1,969,185 applications were refused.  104 of the applications were refused on grounds of 
terrorism.222  The refusals on terrorist grounds could be attributed to the new 
counterterrorism focus and training of consular officials.  Developing and implementing 
training and guidance initiatives cost time and effort.  For example, the duration of the 
State Department’s post-9/11 formal consular course (ConGen) is now 31 days.223  The 
monetary and social costs are relatively minimal.  What can be logically concluded is that 
training accounts for a relatively small percentage of an organization’s overall operating 
budget.  The GAO report on consular training program enhancements does not provide 
overall figures on the costs to implement the specific initiatives.224  General training 
resource allocation data is reported in the Department of State’s FY 2007 budget.  The 
Department of State has allocated $105,062,000 of its FY 2007 $9.504 billion request for 
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training services.  $5,249,000 of the $105,062,000 is to fund consular training.225  Based 
on the literature and according to the training advocates, there are few, if any, 
disadvantages and critics of training and guidance initiatives and efforts.    
Training is such a fundamental requirement for the success and effectiveness of 
any bureaucratic organization.  Training’s trade-offs are generally accepted, and its costs 
are considered “sunk.”  Training and additional guidance are important and necessary 
basic building blocks of U.S. immigration, visa, and customs counterterrorism efforts.  
The staff report on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel was the first of its kind to analyze the threat 
posed by and vulnerabilities of terrorist travel.  The study emphasized the importance of 
trained immigration, visa, and customs officials who follow and enforce the rules.  Doris 
Meissner, former Commissioner of the INS from 1993-2000, corroborates this claim:  
“What can be done is to better safeguard validity and procedures ….what we must do is 
insist that U.S. immigration rules—all of them—do matter and take steps to make them 
work properly.”226   
Following the rules is most effective when officials have a solid knowledge base, 
practical experience, and even intuitive talents.  A solid knowledge base can be 
developed with sustained, updated training and guidance.  A trade-off is that updates 
based on current, shared intelligence and law enforcement information will always be 
required given the ever changing nature of terrorist travel/mobility.  As terrorists change 
their trends, techniques, tactics, and patterns, concurrent modifications should occur in 
training and guidance curricula and programs.  Terrorist organizations, like the terrorists 
themselves, are learning and adaptive entities: 
Al Qaeda has shown a rare diligence and capacity to comply with the 
laws, or at least to appear to comply with them.  For example, there were 
indications in the early 1990s that terrorists were trying to use the asylum 
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became aware of this and started detaining asylum applicants who were 
suspected terrorists, the terrorists switched their tactics and began using 
tourist and student visas.227   
2. SEVIS 
Step 3:  How well does the security solution mitigate the risk? 
SEVIS is another critical counterterror measure that may prevent terrorists from 
entering and attacking the U.S.  SEVIS is the political response to security concerns over 
foreign students dating back to 1972.  SEVIS automated an existing manual data 
collection process and became operational for all incoming foreign students on                     
15 February 2003.228  George Borjas informs that in the wake of 9/ll the issue that raised 
counterterrorism and homeland security red flags was that foreign students may pose a 
physical threat to the U.S.229  Doris Meissner relates why students are a homeland 
security concern.  Even though foreign students and exchange visitors comprise a small 
subset of temporary/nonimmigrant visitors, they have always been a security interest 
because their student status enables them to remain in-country for several years.  Because 
of their selected fields of study, they may also have access to technology and training that 
could be used for nefarious purposes.230   
Janice Kephart links terrorist exploitation of legal immigration and student status 
and even recommends the first key recommendation—training—to counter such terrorist 
travel methods.  During a 30 August 2005 National Press Club news conference featuring 
the Center for Immigration Studies, Kephart noted that such legal immigration and 
student status abuses will likely continue unless the U.S. designs “a system that can snuff 
out the abuse with better information, better technology, better legal and policy 
guidelines, and better training.”231  Trained immigration, visa, and customs officials have 
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one such system that can “snuff out” abuses by foreign students and exchange visitors.  
The system is SEVIS.232  9/11 and Terrorist Travel argues, 
when the September 11 hijackers began entering the United States in 2000 
to attend flight school, there was no student tracking system available.  If 
there had been immigration authorities might well have been alerted to the 
fact that Mohamed Atta, the plan’s ringleader, had made false statements 
about his student status and therefore could have been denied entry into 
the United States.233   
Post-9/11, SEVIS can have “deterrent” and “disruptive” effects.234  SEVIS may 
deter terrorists from exploiting the foreign student and exchange visitor visa program.  
SEVIS may disrupt terrorist operations by denying them pre-9/11 opportunities to remain 
in-country for several years to plan, plot, and execute attacks under the guise of student 
status.  Potential terrorists will be accountable to the Departments of State and Homeland 
Security and educational institutions.  Their names and addresses will be placed in a 
database, and any deviations from their intended educational plans and/or any violations 
of student status will be recognized.  SEVIS targets a subset of the 
temporary/nonimmigrant visitors who may violate legal student status.  SEVIS identifies 
students and may identify potential terrorists who violate the terms of their student 
visas.235  Because of SEVIS requirements, terrorists may reconsider using this popular 
pre-9/11 tactic to gain entrance into the U.S.  The Department of State, DHS, and 
educational institutions will hold potential terrorists accountable for their acceptance to 
and attendance at educational institutions.  By using databases to include SEVIS, 
consular officials in FY 2005 identified 333 potential nonimmigrants as inadmissible 
based on security and terrorist grounds.236 
 The pre-9/11 and the nineteen 9/11 terrorists have showed a propensity to violate 
the terms of their student visas.  Therefore, terrorists may be identified through the 
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routine SEVIS identification of student visa violators.  In 2003, 36,600 potential student 
violators were reported to ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU).  Of the 36,600 
violators, more than 2,900 did not report to school or maintain a full course load or were 
suspended or expelled.  Upon further examination, CEU referred 1,591 cases to the field 
for additional investigation.  Investigations netted 155 arrests.237  
Step 4:  What other risks does the security solution cause? 
Educational institutions have other more pressing concerns than that of U.S. 
homeland security.  SEVIS causes educational institutions and foreign students and 
exchange visitors to incur risks.  Institutions may constrain the implementation and affect 
the overall effectiveness of SEVIS.  The success and effectiveness of a foreign student 
tracking/monitoring system is dependent upon the educational community’s cooperation 
and support.  The educational community objected to SEVIS on the grounds that it is 
“burdensome and intrusive.”  Since 9/11, most of these objections have been quelled.  
Meissner argues, “Universal implementation needs to proceed quickly.”238   
Some of the complaints lodged by the educational community and foreign 
students cause risks that impede the effective implementation of SEVIS.  These 
complaints include:  incurred management responsibilities of SEVIS, technical 
difficulties and database confidentiality, reporting burdens, fee collection requirements, 
and delays in visa issuance.  Prior to 9/11, some university officials contended that they 
would have to take on former-INS enforcement agent duties and responsibilities.  They 
also expressed concern over database integrity and privacy/confidentiality of student 
records.239  Due to the events of 9/11, a broad consensus developed among the 
educational community.  The educational community rallied in support of a foreign 
student tracking system.  DHS was criticized for not providing training to education 
officials charged with administering SEVIS.  Nonetheless, ICE confirmed that SEVIS 
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should be operational for all incoming students.  All continuing foreign students have 
been entered in SEVIS as of August 2003.240   
SEVIS not only affects the educational institutions and students, but it also invites 
financial risks for the U.S.  The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s 
Future asserts, “For the past 50 years, the United States has comfortably enjoyed its 
position as the top destination for international students.”  As the top destination, the U.S. 
had profited from the $30 billion per year higher education market.241  The Task Force 
elaborates, “Indeed, educating foreign students may be one of the best long-term 
investments the United States makes in pursuit of international peace and prosperity, 
while also bringing billions of dollars into the U.S. economy -- $13.3 billion in the 2004-
2005 school year.”242  The travel industry has also chimed in, noting the impact and 
importance of international students to the U.S. economy.  In a January 2006 Migration 
Policy Institute report, Jeanne Batalova cites a 2005 Travel Industry Association of 
America study: 
The United States is the most profitable tourist and education destinations 
in the world.  For example, in 2004, international tourists spent about $94 
billion in the United States, and international students contributed another 
$12.9 billion dollars in tuition and living expenses.243   
A global competition for talent especially in the fields of science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) has bumped the U.S. from its exalted position.  
Some in the educational industry believe SEVIS may continue to hasten the U.S. descent 
from the top position.244  A Migration Policy Institute paper cites reports by the GAO 
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and the Institute of International Education (IIE) that disagree with this assertion:  “the 
decline in the number of international students is not due to SEVIS.”245  They justifiably 
and rightly contend that the decline is attributed to real/perceived difficulties in obtaining 
student visas, rising U.S. tuitions, aggressive recruiting by other English-speaking 
nations, and perceptions that the U.S. is closing its doors.246   
Step 5:  What trade-offs does the security solution require? 
In addition to the educational community and foreign students, other critics have 
questioned the effectiveness of and funding for SEVIS.  These critics have pointed to the 
trade-offs/costs of SEVIS.  Alison Siskin reports, “Through SEVIS, DHS should be able 
to identify students who have violated the terms of their visas; however, some question 
whether DHS has the staff to locate all the student violators, and whether it is a beneficial 
use of DHS resources to do so.”247  Such constructive criticism and trade-off arguments 
have been muted.  High-profile incidents that polish the image and highlight the 
effectiveness of SEVIS will justify its continued implementation.  SEVIS security 
measures have been credited with the successful detection of several unaccounted foreign 
students who were in violation of the terms of their visas.  In the summer of 2006, eleven 
Egyptian student visa holders were permitted entrance at U.S. ports of entry.  However, 
they did not attend classes nor did they report to the appropriate Montana State 
University SEVIS administrators.  Following SEVIS requirements, university officials 
reported their absence to DHS.  DHS located and apprehended six of the eleven foreign 
students and continued to investigate the whereabouts of the remaining five.  The 
outcome of such high-profile tracking identifications and apprehensions is that “Incidents 
such as this one are generally accepted as indicators that SEVIS is working as 
intended.248   
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The administrative and maintenance costs of SEVIS are covered by fees paid by 
those it is designed to track.  SEVIS is a self-funded, fee-based program.  Its operating 
budget is derived from fees.  Foreign students and exchange visitors are required to pay a 
$100 fee prior to obtaining their visas.  This fee requirement became effective on               
1 September 2004.249  That being said, SEVIS does serve as a necessary countermeasure 
that focuses efforts on a subset of the temporary/nonimmigrant population (foreign 
students and exchange visitors) and a community (educational) that demonstrated the 
potential to violate the rules pre-9/11.  Michael O’Hanlon contends that SEVIS is a useful 
measure to monitor people and identify student visa overstayers:  “(SEVIS) now appears 
to be functioning quite well in helping track those foreigners in the United States on 
student visas.”250  This same, routine monitoring function may also identify and intercept 
terrorists.  SEVIS is experiencing growing pains trying to establish new procedures with 
regard to a resistant educational community with well-established business practices and 
different motivations and priorities.251  SEVIS is a countermeasure that deserves its place 
amongst the prioritized and funded countermeasures.  Most of the challenges of and 
complaints about SEVIS deal mostly with management, administrative, and operational 
issues.   
Incurred management responsibilities of SEVIS, technical difficulties and 
database integrity, reporting burdens, fee collection requirements, and delays in visa 
issuance demand attention, analysis, and resolution.  Better coordination and 
communication between DHS and the educational community can help resolve 
responsibility, requirement, burden, and delay issues and concerns.  An example of such 
coordination and communication efforts is the DHS establishment of a SEVIS Response 
Team to work with inspectors, schools, and students to resolve issues with respect to 
student admissions to the U.S.252  SEVIS program managers also offer opportunities for 
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key SEVIS stakeholders (i.e., Department of State, DHS, and educational 
institutions/community) to provide feedback on SEVIS implementation operation, 
performance, and suggested improvements.  This SEVIS outreach program is involves bi-
weekly stakeholder conference calls to provide updates and solicit feedback.253  The 
positive results of such cooperative efforts should be publicized and distributed to 
overseas Consular Affairs posts, to educational institutions, and to the prospective 
international student community.  Many of the issues and concerns with SEVIS could be 
quelled by developing a better implementation plan which includes an organized 
marketing/publicity plan which clearly, periodically, and objectively presents the SEVIS 
costs/benefits, advantages/disadvantages, progress/status, success/failures, and 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness of SEVIS.  None of the sources used to draft this thesis 
advocate the scrapping of SEVIS.  SEVIS offers the U.S. a way to routinely enforce 
immigration law and adds integrity to the international student nonimmigrant visa 
program.  SEVIS adds a much needed element of compliance to the foreign student and 
exchange visitor tracking.  Its terrorist deterrent and disruptive effects are also valuable.  
Just because the implementation and delivery of a system is less than optimal, that should 
not negate the basic concept, the inherent benefits of the system, or its lessons learned:  
“most observers view the SEVIS system as adequate for monitoring students and alerting 
authorities to suspicious behavior or unlawful movement.”254       
3. NSEERS 
Step 3:  How well does the security solution mitigate the risk? 
 In addition to the 9/11 Commission, almost all sources agree on the importance of 
an entry-exit system and its tremendous terrorist travel/mobility mitigation potential.  As 
with training and SEVIS, several post-9/11 legislative mandates have directed its 
implementation.  Similar to training and SEVIS, the concept of NSEERS has proven its 
worth based on the hard lessons learned from 9/11 and about its perpetrators.255  
Admittedly, NSEERS does have its share of challenges; however, the absence of an 
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entry-exit system is an omission with grave homeland security implications.  An entry-
exit system is a countermeasure that provides a basic sense of border control.  Not 
knowing who is coming into/going out of the U.S. or who has violated the terms of their 
visas is a risk that is no longer desirable nor acceptable in the post-9/11 security 
environment.   
 Along with trained personnel and SEVIS, NSEERS can assist in the routine 
enforcement of U.S. immigration and visa law and policy.  NSEERS identifies visitors 
who have violated the terms of their temporary nonimmigrant visas.  It is a tracking tool 
that can support overall overstay identification efforts by tackling the endemic problem of 
overstays which still remains unresolved.  True estimates of the number of nonimmigrant 
overstays are not available.  An attempt to quantify this unknown has produced the 
following:  estimates range from 31% to 57% of the unauthorized population.256       
Based on feedback and previous assessments, NSEERS 30-day and annual re-
registration requirements were suspended on 2 December 2003.  DHS reasoned that 
resources no longer used for non-value added re-registration processes would be 
reallocated to NSEERS improvements.  The original intent of NSEERS remained intact 
by continuing two procedures:  1) registration procedures at ports of entry to include 
fingerprinting, photographing, and registering aliens, and 2) registration procedures at 
points of departure.  DHS upheld the importance and benefits of NSEERS: “Special 
registration of aliens has, consistent with the program’s intent, provided important law 
enforcement benefits, which have included the identification of a number of alien 
terrorists and criminals.”257   
The 9/11 Commission contends that NSEERS had both deterrent and disruptive 
effects.  Would-be terrorists were sent a clear signal that immigration law and policies 
would be enforced.258  9/11 and Terrorist travel also argues, “NSEERS had a disruptive 
effect because it ‘forc[ed] would be terrorists to comply with the terms and conditions of 
their admissions to the U.S. or run the risk of being removed.’”  The disruptive effect 
adds requirements, stress, and pressure to the “job” of a terrorist, thereby, making their 
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operations more difficult.  The disruptive effect can contribute to the disruption of the 
terrorist mission.259  Soon after the implementation of NSEERS, immigration authorities 
fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned 80,000 men.260  The 9/11 Commission 
reports the most current, publicized NSEERS statistics that relate to identifying and 
stopping terrorists.  DHS revealed 11 out the approximately 140,000 total registrants had 
terrorist affiliations.261  Therefore, 11 immigration law violators and potentially harmful 
terrorists and their operations may have been disrupted.   
Step 4:  What other risks does the security solution cause? 
NSEERS causes risks for a subset of the temporary/nonimmigrant population 
subject to NSEERS registration requirements.  NSEERS has been criticized for targeting 
Arab and Muslim foreign nationals for special registration requirements.  Susan Martin 
and Philip Martin cite a Migration Policy Institute report: “the Special Registration 
program implicitly assumes that all citizens of the stated countries are suspected of 
participating in terrorist activities.”262  The consequence of this perception/reality is the 
risk of alienating potential intelligence sources and a cooperative Arab/Muslim 
community.  This risk perception is based on civil liberties and profiling concerns 
regarding the selective enforcement of immigration based on nationality.  When accepted 
and implemented, nationality-based enforcement programs may have spillover effects for 
targeted segments of the nonimmigrant subset and the U.S. population.263  A 2003 
Migration Policy Institute report on post-9/11 domestic security and civil liberties 
challenges informs that hate crimes aimed in the U.S. at Muslims post-9/11 rose, 
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increasing more than 1,500 percent.  Furthermore, employment discrimination against 
Muslim- and Arab-Americans and South Asians increased, resulting in the federal Equal 
Opportunity Commission receiving over 700 employment discrimination complaints in 
the 15 months after 9/11.264  As with SEVIS, many of the civil liberty and profiling 
issues and concerns with NSEERS could be quelled by developing a better 
implementation plan which includes an organized publicity plan and establishes mediums 
for the targeted and affected Arab-Muslim community to provide feedback.   
For example, the Migration Policy Institute report chronicles the President’s visit 
to a Washington, D.C. mosque shortly after the events of 9/11.  This visit had a profound 
impact on the Arab-Muslim community.  Community and religious leaders viewed the 
gesture positively as not only a symbolic gesture but also acknowledged how it satisfies 
“a critical need for senior government officials to deliver sustained messages of 
inclusiveness, tolerance, and the value of diversity.”265  By opening the lines of 
communication and understanding, these opportunities offer NSEERS program managers 
to inform the Arab-Muslim community of NSEERS purpose, intent, operations, progress, 
and effectiveness.  Arabs and Muslims can voice their concerns and provide feedback.  
US-VISIT will assuage fears of targeting the Arab/Muslim subgroup, as it will track all 
temporary/nonimmigrant visitors.  The 9/11 Commission informs that DHS plans to have 
the functions of NSEERS absorbed by the more comprehensive, integrated US-VISIT 
database “which captures the fingerprints and photographs of nonimmigrant visa holders 
upon entry and exit—[and] ‘will ultimately subsume the functions of the NSEERS 
program.’”266  That being the case, an additional implementation and effectiveness 
assessment of US-VISIT would be required to determine its prioritization and funding.  
This thesis does not cover such as assessment.   
Step 5:  What trade-offs does the security solution require? 
NSEERS requires the following trade-off:  it is not a foolproof entry-exit tracking 
system.  Terrorists may take advantage of a loophole in airport departure registrations.  
NSEERS procedures do not account for inspectors’ observing departures.  For example, 
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when leaving the U.S. via air, departure registration takes place at a designated location 
in the airport, not at airport departure gates.  By not escorting registrants to their 
respective departure gate, there is no guarantee that the registrant actually left.267  
Terrorists who travel by land, sea, or rail can also take advantage of this loophole.  In 
reference to NSEERS program costs, the Homeland Security Department FY 2007 
appropriations lumps funding for NSEERS together with other ICE programs such as:  
US-VISIT and investigations/non-administration funding for SEVIS.  $1,457 million was 
requested in the President’s budget for the ICE domestic operations for NSEERS, US-
VISIT, and SEVIS.268   
All three countermeasures have trade-offs, or costs, associated with them such as:  
time, effort, monetary, social, liberty, privacy, time, and convenience.  Other trade-
offs/costs are caused by the economic fallout associated with the loss of business and 
international confidence.  The U.S. loses visitors, workers, and students and their dollars 
and talent.  U.S. must bear trade-offs/costs that countermeasures require.  Assessing the 
value of countermeasures is not an absolute science.  When making prioritization and 
allocation decisions, there has to be an acceptance of some level of associated trade-
offs/costs.  9/11 and Terrorist Travel asserts,  
It is difficult to gauge the counterterrorism benefit from these programs 
because information on how they have affected terrorists is not always 
easy to come by….Ultimately, it is difficult to measure success of 
operations whose goals include deterrence…The routine enforcement of 
laws, including those not specifically related to terrorism, can therefore 
raise obstacles for and in some cases have a deterrent effect on individuals 
intending to commit terrorist attacks.269  
Trained personnel who use SEVIS and NSEERS can assist in the routine 
enforcement of the laws.  These countermeasures can track temporary/nonimmigrant 
visitors, identify and intercept violators/overstayers, and they can hopefully deter 
potential terrorists in the process.  When coupled with intelligence and law enforcement 
information sharing, trained personnel, SEVIS, and NSEERS are “smart” U.S. homeland 
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security investments.  By leveraging the capabilities of SEVIS and NSEERS, trained 
immigration, visa, and customs officials can effectively track, monitor, and screen for 
nefarious legal visitors who have violated the terms of their visas.270   
B. CONCLUSION 
The 9/11 Commission opens 9/1l and Terrorist Travel with the following 
observations and recommendation:   
It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry out 
attacks in the United States if they are unable to enter the country.  Yet 
prior to September 11, while there were efforts to enhance border security, 
no agency of the U.S. government thought of border security as a tool in 
the counterterrorism arsenal.  Indeed, even after the 19 hijackers 
demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining 
admission into the United States, border security still is not considered a 
cornerstone of national security policy.  We believe, for reasons we 
discuss in the following pages, that it must be made one.271 
In the five years that have passed since 9/11, there is no question that this 9/11 
Commission recommendation has been acknowledged and heeded.  Border security 
which encompasses immigration, visa, and customs systems has been made a cornerstone 
of national security.  Border security concerns have infiltrated the counterterrorism 
dialogue and have impressed themselves on the collective domestic and international 
psyche of immigration policy and national security.  One of the fact-based assumptions of 
this thesis contends that oftentimes illegal immigration concerns are conflated with 
national security.  This is faulty logic.  9/11 fallout has prompted urgent claims to 
surface.  Some claim that illegal immigration must be controlled because of the potential 
for terrorists to take advantage of weaknesses in U.S. immigration law, border control, 
and interior enforcement.  They argue that these weaknesses and inefficiencies have 
enabled ~12 million illegal immigrants to circumvent and evade immigration, visa, and 
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customs systems.  The claim is predicated on fears that terrorists will innocuously blend 
in with the unauthorized immigrant flows and population.  This claim presumes that 
terrorists will take the same calculated risks and have the same motivations and 
incentives as those braving the heat of and evading Border Patrol agents at the Southwest 
border.  Ultimately, the unauthorized immigrant population must pay for the national 
security “collective good.”272   
The presence of ~12 million unauthorized immigrants is being used as 
ammunition to tout national security concerns in the post-9/11 security environment.  
Yet, illegal immigrants are more of an economic and social concern, not a matter of 
counterterrorism national security.  If an illegal immigrant were to perpetrate a terrorist 
attack, then the policies, prioritization, and funding to bolster the security of the 
Southwest border could be partly justified.  By conflating illegal immigration and 
national security/terrorism, counterterror measure prioritization and resource allocation 
become skewed, as do the perceptions of counterterror measure/security solution 
implementation and assessment.  The three security solutions used to counter terrorist 
entry are roped in with unsuccessful efforts to alleviate illegal immigration woes:   
The nation’s attention is currently focused on illegal immigration, which 
colors people’s views about all aspects of immigration.  Americans are 
deeply divided and conflicted in their opinions about whether immigration 
helps or hurts the country, and what policies should be implemented to 
combat illegal immigration…..Americans do not give the government high 
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Consequently, this conflation has bred general border security “insecurity.”274  Illegal 
immigration and U.S. labor demand and Mexico and Central and South America labor 
supplies should not be conflated with terrorism, homeland defense, and national 
security.275 
Nevertheless, according to the findings of this thesis, any insecurity about the 
three counterterror measures/security solutions is over exaggerated at most and 
unfounded at best.  Once given the counterterrorism focus that the 9/11 Commission and 
other immigration and national security experts have recommended, implementation was 
demanded, and assessments were available.  Assessments such as this thesis offers are 
integral to not only research efforts but also to counterterror measure prioritization and 
resource allocation endeavors.  The three key recommendations serve their purpose well 
and should be acknowledged and used to prevent terrorist entry.  Their implementation 
and assessment was warranted even in the pre-9/11 security environment.  The three 
security solutions would have been effective at contributing to the denial of terrorist entry 
pre-9/11.  The three security solutions target legal, nonimmigrant, student travel patterns 
and methods typified by the nineteen 9/11 terrorists.276 
Before the events of 9/11, nineteen terrorists took advantage of gaps/weaknesses 
in immigration, visa, and customs systems.  Because of the gaps/weaknesses, they 
entered the U.S. and committed the attacks.  Therefore, the 9/11 Commission prescribed  
three key policies to enhance the effectiveness of post-9/11 immigration, visa, and 
customs systems.  Closing the gaps in these systems would require implementation of 
these recommendations as counterterrorism measures.  Their value and effectiveness as 
counterterror measures will depend on their ability to stop terrorists from entering the 
U.S.   
                                                 
274 Ewing, 1. 
275 Ewing, 1.  “Since 9/11, concern has mounted among policymakers and law-enforcement 
authorities that foreign terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda might use Mexico as a transit point to enter the 
United States, relying on the same people smuggling networks as undocumented immigrants and becoming 
lost in the large undocumented flow.  Some lawmakers have voiced fears that terrorists might be among the 
growing number of undocumented non-Mexicans crossing the southern border, although these Other Than 
Mexicans (OTMs) come principally from Central and South America.  There is no evidence this has 
happened…U.S. national security would be better served if undocumented labor migration were taken out 
of the border-security equation….[and if the U.S.]…cold focus more on finding terrorists and less on 
apprehending jobseekers.” 
276 Chishti, et al., “America’s Challenge:  Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Security 
Unity After September 11,” 12.   
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In assessing the ability of the recommendations to stop terrorists, it has been 
determined that all three recommendations have their costs/benefits, pros/cons, and 
opportunities/challenges.  No counterterror measure is without its flaws.  After assessing 
the three recommendations, it is evident that the U.S. has improved its pre-9/11 
immigration, visa, customs, and border security systems.  These systems may enable the 
U.S. to capitalize on opportunities to analyze and disrupt terrorist travel/mobility 
vulnerabilities in order to stop terrorists from entering the U.S.  As counterterror 
measures, the key recommendations aid in the identification and interception of terrorists 
abroad, at the border, and in-county.  Trained people who might have leveraged 
technological tools such as SEVIS and NSEERS may have prevented the 19 terrorists 
from committing the 9/11 attacks.  The post-9/11 immigration, visa, and customs systems 
are more effective at mitigating the terrorist threat today than they were pre-9/11 simply 
because their gaps/weaknesses have been identified post-9/11.  
Providing standardized operational training and additional guidance and 
maintaining a foreign student visa compliance system and a national entry-exit system are 
crucial counterterror measures that should receive the commensurate resource allocation.  
Their benefits far outweigh their minimal monetary and social costs.  If the U.S. does not 
stop terrorists from entering the country and another terrorist attack occurs, the resource 
and trade-off costs of implementing, maintaining, and monitoring the three 
recommendations would still be justified.  The continued implementation of these 
recommendations is validated in the post-9/11 environment.  They cause tolerable risks 
and require acceptable trade-offs.  They mitigate the terrorist threat by frustrating terrorist 
travel/mobility.  When coupled with intelligence and law enforcement information 
sharing, they offer the U.S. opportunities to deny terrorist entrance into the U.S. 
Continued implementation and periodic assessments of these recommendations 
will help to increase their effectiveness as counterterror measures designed to stop 
terrorist entrance and prevent terrorist attacks.  Perhaps more time and some patience is 
needed, as only five years have passed since the events of 9/11.  Implementing and 
assessing countermeasures take time.  Assessments of implemented countermeasures are 
critical.  Assessments ensure prioritization and resource allocation decisions are based on 
facts and not on purely political reactions and public fears.  Assessments help 
77 
policymakers and officials to determine which countermeasures should be continued and 
funded and which ones should be discontinued and unfunded.  Susan Ginsberg says it 
best:  
In the new environment, there are too many new requirements and 
initiatives piled on top of one another that lack adequate and 
commensurate resources.  Good ideas are not lacking in Washington, and 
the project of remaking national security to deal with terrorism has 
brought about an outpouring of contributions and initiatives.  But even 
good ideas are badly timed if they do not allow earlier initiatives a chance 
to develop in stages—to mature, falter, recover, and make good on their 
promises.277   
The three key recommendations should be given a chance to develop in stages.  
The recommendations should be given high priority as immigration, visa, customs, and 
border security systems counterterror measures.  Priority should be placed and funds 
should be allocated where the security solutions can bolster the efforts of the away game 
and its key players.  By beating terrorists at the away game, the home game win is more 
assured.  “Pushing out” U.S. borders keeps the terrorists away and stops them from 
entering the U.S.  Identifying and intercepting terrorists abroad makes the U.S. homeland 
secure.  If the terrorists cannot travel, they cannot enter or attack the U.S.  In the case of 
these three recommendations, the ends (effectiveness/ability to stop terrorists) justify 














                                                 
277 Susan Ginsberg, “Countering Terrorist Mobility:  Shaping an Operational Strategy,” Migration 
Policy Institute Report, February 2006, 
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